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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse se compose de trois essais ayant trait essentiellement à l'économie des 
ressources naturelles et de l'environnement. Elle porte sur la définition d 'une qualité des 
institutions permettant l'exploitation optimale de ressources naturelles. Son principal ob-
jectif est d 'étudier la qualité de droits de propriété permettant d'exploiter optimalement 
une ressource naturelle ou d'accumuler optimalement du capital physique. 
Dans le premier essai qui s' intitule «The optimal quality of property r ights in presence 
of externality and market power», nous considerons une économie avec une ressource 
naturelle renouvelable. Nous nous demandons s' il existe des circonstances dans lesquelles 
des droits de propriété partiels sur un stock de ressource naturelle peuvent permettre 
son exploitation optimale. Pour répondre à cette question, nous traitons la qualité (ou le 
degré de complétude) des droits de propriété sur un stock de ressource naturelle comme 
une variable endogène continue dans une économie où un nombre limité de firmes détient 
du pouvoir de marché. Sous des hypothèses standards, nous montrons qu 'il existe toujours 
un degré de complétude des droits de propriété qui condui t à une exploitation optimale 
de premier rang de la ressource naturelle. Les droits de propriété optimaux ne sont ni 
complets, ni absents mais partiels. Un corollaire à ce résultat est que des droits complets 
ne constituent ni une condition suffisante, ni une condition nécessaire d 'optimalité en 
présence de pouvoir de marché. Nous déterminons une expression analytique de la qualité 
optimale des droits de propriété et identifions les paramètres dont elle dépend. 
Le deuxième essai s' intitule «Üverlapping generations, natural resources and the opti-
mal quality of pro pert y rights» . Dans ce deuxième chapitre, nous considérons une économie 
avec générations imbriquées, qui est parfaitement compétitive, c'est à dire sans imperfec-
tions de marché, et dans laquelle une ressource naturelle est exploitée. Nous étudions la 
qualité optimale de droits de propriété portant sur le stock de ressource. La qualité des 
droits de propriété est définie comme la proportion du stock de ressource protégée, le reste 
étant en libre accès. Nous montrons que des droits complets ne sont pas toujours opti-
maux, des droits de propriété partiels sur le stock de ressource sont alors nécessaires pour 
exploiter la ressource optimalement. Nous montrons ainsi que des institutions parfaites 
ne sont pas toujours synonymes d ' institutions complètes et ce même dans une économie 
parfaitement compétitive. Des institutions complètes peuvent être aussi dommageables 
que des institutions trop faibles quand une économie tend à suraccumuler du stock de 
ressource à l 'équilibre. 
Le troisième essai est une extension du deuxième et s'intitule «Üverlapping genera-
tions, physical capital and the optimal quality of property rights». Dans cet essai , nous 
considérons une économie avec générations imbriquées, qui est parfaitement compétitive , 
dans laquelle le capital et le travail sont les deux facteurs de production. Le capital se dis-
tingue d 'une ressource naturelle renouvelable par le fait que le stock entier de capital, et 
non une quantité extraite de ce stock, est utilisé chaque période dans la production et par 
le fait que la dépréciation est une contribution négative au stock tandis que la croissance 
naturelle d 'une ressource est une cont ribution positive au stock. Ces différences ont un 
impact sur la qualité optimale des droits de propriété. En effet , des droits partiels sur le 
stock de capital auraient pour effet de baisser le coût considéré du facteur capital lors des 
décisions d'utilisation de facteurs de production et donc d 'accroître la demande de capital. 
Ce qui aurait pour conséquence sous des hypothèses standards d 'accroitre l' accumulation 
de capital. Contrairement aux résultats du deuxième essai, les droits de propriété sur le 
stock de capital doivent optimalement être complets. Cependant, nous montrons que des 
droits de propriété partiels sur le revenu de la génération active peuvent permettre d 'at-
teindre l'optimum de premier rang. Comme des droits de propriété partiels sur le revenu 
des jeunes peuvent à tort être compris comme une forme de taxation car ils ont aussi 
pour conséquence de transférer des revenus, nous expliquons que des similitudes dans les 
effets cachent de profondes différences de nature et d 'origine entre des droits de propriété 
partiels et un impôt sur le revenu. 
ABSTRACT 
T his thesis consists of three essays related mainly to the economies of natural resources 
and the environment. We study the quality of institutions allowing an optimal exploitation 
of a natural resource. We focus on the determination of the quali ty of property rights 
allowing to optimally exploit a renewable resource or, as in the third e::;say, Lo opLimally 
accumulate physical capital. 
In the first essay, entitled "The optimal quality of property rights in presence of ex-
ternali ty and market power" , acknowledging the fact that there are many instances where 
property rights are neither perfectly defined nor perfectly enforced, we address the follo-
wing question : could there be instances where partial property rights are economically 
efficient in a renewable resource economy? To address this question, we treat the quality 
(or leve! of completeness) of property rights as a continuous endogenous variable in a rene-
wable resource economy where a finite number of firms exercises market power. We show 
that there exists a leve! of property rights completeness that leads to first-best resource 
exploitation in the presence of market power. This leve! is different from either absent or 
complete property rights. As a corollary, complete rights are neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for efficiency in the presence of market power. We derive an analytic expression for 
the optimallevel of property-r ight. completeness and discuss its determinants. The optimal 
leve! depends on i) the number of firms; ii) the elasticity of input productivity and iii ) the 
priee elasticity of market demand. 
The second essay is ent itled "Overlapping generations, natural resources and the op-
timal quality of property rights" . In this essay, we relax the assumption made in the first 
essay of the existence of a market imperfection (in the form of market power) and we in-
vestigate the merits for a perfectly competitive economy involving a renewable resource to 
have partial property rights. Can partial property r ights be socially optimal in an otherwise 
perfect economy? If so, under which circumstances? In a decentralized perfectly compe-
titive economy involving a renewable natural resource and overlapping generations, we 
show that optimal institutions should make it possible to infringe on a resource stock. The 
quality of property rights on the resource is defined as the proportion of the resource that 
can be appropriated rather than left under open access. With quasi-linear preferences and 
a strictly concave renewable resource growth function, we show that there always exists 
a quality of property rights leading to optimal steady-state extraction and resource stock 
levels. When the utili ty discount factor is too high, full appropriation of the resource stock 
leads to overaccumulation of the resource asset. The optimal quality of property rights 
involves sorne limitation to open access to counter the tragedy of the commons but not 
full private appropriation, because full appropriation would lead to an excessive amount 
of savings. 
The third essay, ent itled "Overlapping generations, physical capital and the optimal 
quality of property rights", builds on the second essay. In this essay, we explain how 
conventional capital differs from a renewable resource and how those differences impact the 
optimal quality of property rights. In fact, contrary to a resource stock, partial property 
rights on a capital stock does not prevent capital overaccumulation ; they worsen the 
situation. We investigate the merits for an economy, using physical capital and labor 
as inputs in production, to have partial property rights and show that, in a perfectly 
competitive economy without market imperfections where agents live finite lives, optimal 
institutions should make it possible to appropriate a proportion of the young's incarne. 
The quality of property rights on the young's incarne is defined as the proportion of her 
labor incarne that the young can retain. We show that there always exists a quality of 
property rights on the young's incarne that leads to the first-best optimal steady-state. 
Partial property rights on incarne may wrongly be construed as a diff'erent name for an 
incarne tax because both have the eff'ect of transferring incarne; we argue that similarities 
in eff'ects hide significant diff'erences in nature and origins. 
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Chapitre 1 
INTRODUCTION 
L'objet de cette thèse est d 'étudier les caractéristiques d 'institutions permettant 
une exploitation économiquement optimale de ressources naturelles ou l'accumula-
tion économiquement optimale d 'un stock de capital. Par instit utions, nous enten-
dons ce que Douglass North (1991) a décrit comme les contraintes créées par les 
humains qui structurent les interactions politiques, économiques et sociales . Elles 
comprennent à la fois les contraintes informelles (sanctions, tabous, coutumes, tra-
ditions et codes de conduites) et les règles formelles (constitutions, lois, droits de 
propriété). Dans cette introduction, nous donnons d 'abord un ensemble d 'exemples 
de ressources naturelles surexploitées en raison d'institutions inadéquates, ce qui 
souligne la pertinence et l'importance de l'étude d'institutions optimales. ous ex-
pliquons ensuite pourquoi parmi les institutions nous avons choisi de concentrer 
notre étude sur les droits de propriété. Puis , nous revoyons ce que la théorie éco-
nomique traditionnelle nous apprend sur la qualité optimale des droits de propriété 
avant de présenter des exemples de situations dans lesquelles, en contradiction ap-
parente avec les prescriptions de la théorie économique traditionnelle, des droits de 
propriété partiels sont en vigueur. Finalement, nous présentons les chapitres qm 
suivent et qui correspondent à chacun des trois essais composant cette thèse. 
L'organisation des nations unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (en anglais : 
Food and Agriculture Organization, "FAO ") (2011) estime que 29.9% de l'ensemble 
des stocks de poissons faisant l'objet d 'une pêche en mer sont écologiquement surex-
ploités produisant de moins bons rendements que leurs potentiels biologiques et éco-
logiques respectifs. 57.4% sont pleinement exploités au sens écologique. Nous savons 
qu 'en présence de coûts d 'exploitation, la surexploitation économique survient géné-
ralement à un niveau de stock plus élevé que la surexploitation écologique (Grafton 
et al., 2007). Il est donc probable qu'en réalité, au delà des 29.9% de stocks surex-
ploités écologiquement , une très grande majorité des stocks de poissons mondiaux 
sont économiquement surexploités. Certaines espèces sont particulièrement sujettes 
à la surexploitation incluant un tiers des espèces de thon, le flétan, l'espadon, le 
merlu, etc. La surexploitation de ressources naturelles renouvelables ne se limite 
malheureusement pas à la pêche. La FAO (2010) indique que la déforestation au ni-
veau mondial bien qu 'elle montre de légers signes de ralentissement se poursuit à un 
rythme alarmant. Des exemples de pays dans lesquels la déforestation, dont la cause 
est la surexploitation, est un problème majeur incluent Madagascar, la Cote d 'Ivoire, 
le Vietnam, le Cambodge, la Colombie, le Brésil, etc. Enfin, de nombreuses espèces 
animales sont en danger en raison de chasses illégales parmi lesquelles les éléphants 
asiatiques, les t igres, les léopards, etc. Ce sont autant d 'exemples de situations dans 
lesquelles les institutions se montrent inefficaces pour protéger des ressources natu-
relles. Cette inefficacité s'explique par la difficulté à définir et à protéger des droits 
de propriété sur des ressources naturelles renouvelables. Toute étude des institutions 
doit donc s'interroger sur les caractéristiques d'institutions optimales. Le propos de 
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cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de ce qui détermine des institutions 
optimales. 
Parmi les différentes institutions, les droits de propriété sont sans doute l'ins-
titution la plus fondamentale. En effet, les droits de propriété servent d 'incitatifs 
à la création d 'autres institutions pour les définir et les protéger (North, 1990). Ils 
sont aussi une composante explicative majeure des comportements sociaux et écono-
miques puisque leur distribution affecte les prises de décision concernant l'utilisation 
d 'une ressource et donc les performances économiques (Libecap, 1989). Par ailleurs, 
en définissant les preneurs de décisions, la distribution des droits de propriété déter-
mine les acteurs économiques et définit la distribution de la richesse dans la société. 
Nous concentrons donc notre étude des institutions sur les droits de propriété et 
étudions leur qualité optimale. 
Nous reviendrons dans chacun des chapitres de cette thèse sur les avancées les 
plus récentes de la science économique dans l'étude des droits de propriété et situe-
rons alors chacun des essais qui composent cette thèse dans la littérature économique 
pertinente. Nous indiquons seulement ici, dans une première approche, que la théorie 
économique traditionnelle nous apprend, avec le premier théorème du bien-être, que 
dans un cadre stat ique ou dans un cadre dynamique dans lequel les agents écono-
miques ont une durée de vie infinie, une économie parfaitement compétitive, c'est à 
dire en particulier sans imperfections de marché et sans externalités, doit conduire 
à un équilibre décentralisé dans lequel l'exploitation d'une ressource est optimale et 
dans lequel l'accumulation de capital est également optimale. Une économie parfaite-
ment compétitive s'entend comme une économie dans laquelle les droits de propriété 
sont parfaitement définis et protégés. La théorie économique traditionnelle nous ap-
prend aussi que l'absence de droits de propriété sur une ressource naturelle peut 
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conduire à sa surexploitation voire à son extinction, quand les agents économiques 
ne coopèrent pas entre eux. Il s'agit de ce qu 'Hardin (1968) appelle la tragédie des 
ressources communes. 
Dans la réalité, il existe cependant de nombreuses situations dans lesquelles les 
droits de propriété ne sont ni complets, ni absents, mais partiels. Ainsi, Dupont et 
Grafton (2001) fournissent un exemple d'un système de quota de pêche en Nouvelle-
Ecosse dans lequel des quotas individuels transférables (ITQ) sont définis sur une 
partie seulement d 'une prise tot ale permise (TAC) , le reste demeurant en accès 
libre. Harrisson (2004) et Stavins (2011) fournissent d 'autres exemples d 'espèces de 
poissons qui migrent entre des zones où la pêche est réglementée et des zones non 
réglementées dans les eaux internationales . Grainger et Castello (2011) fournissent 
l'exemple de régimes de quotas de pêche en Nouvelle-Zélande qui sont partiellement 
protégés en raison de migrations et de pêches illégales. Les droits de propriété par-
tiels ne concernent pas seulement les ressources naturelles renouvelables . Ainsi, le 
gisement de gaz de South Pars/North Dome, qui est le plus grand gisement de gaz 
au monde, se situe entre l'Iran et le Qatar et si chaque pays a en principe une réserve 
attribuée, les appropriations illégales ne sont pas rares. Enfin, comme nous l'indi-
quons dans le troisième essai de cette thèse, des droits de propriété part iels peuvent 
aussi concerner des revenus. P ar exemple, les lois qui contraignent les enfants adultes 
à survenir aux besoins de leurs parents âgés, légitiment une appropriation partielle 
des revenus des enfants par leurs parents (Schoonbrodt et Tertilt, 2010). L'objet de 
cette thèse est de proposer une explication économique à la survenance fréquente de 
régimes de droits partiels. Ainsi , nous tentons de répondre spécifiquement à laques-
tion : est-ce que des droits de propriété partiels peuvent permettre une exploitation 
optimale d 'une ressource naturelle (essais 1 et 2 qui correspondent aux chapitres 2 et 
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3 de cette thèse) ou permettre l'accumulation optimale d 'un stock de capital (essai 3 
qui correspond au chapit re 4 de cette thèse)? E t, si oui , dans quelles circonstances? 
De nombreuses ressources naturelles sont surexploitées. Le message principal de 
cette thèse n 'est donc pas de déconseiller le renforcement des droits de propriété mais 
de montrer formellement, dans différentes circonstances, que la distance jusqu'à des 
droits de propriété optimaux est parfois plus courte qu 'on ne le croit généralement . 
Le chapitre 2 s'intéresse à la qualité optimale de droits de propriété sur un stock 
de ressource en présence d 'externalités et de pouvoir de marché. Le chapitre 3 re-
lâche l'hypothèse de l 'existence d 'imperfection de marché sous la forme de pouvoir 
de marché et considère une économie à générations imbriquées, parfaitement compé-
t it ive. Dans ce contexte, nous y étudions la qualité opt imale de droits de propriété 
sur un stock de ressource . Le chapitre 4 se base sur l'approche du chapitre 3 mais, 
après avoir spécifié les différences entre un stock de capital et un stock de ressource 
naturelle, nous y étudions la qualité optimale de droits de propriété dans une éco-
nomie dans laquelle les facteurs de production sont le capital et le travail. Nous 
concluons dans le chapit re 5. 
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In this thesis, we study the characteristics of institutions necessary for an optimal 
exploitation of a natural resource or an optimal accumulation of a capital stock in 
an economy. Institutions are defined, following D. North (1991) , as the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economie and social interaction. They 
consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions , laws , property rights). In this 
introduction, we first provide examples of over-harvested natural resources due to 
inadequate institutions; these examples underline the importance and the relevance 
of studying the characteristics of optimal institutions. We then explain, why among 
the different institutions, we focus on property rights and their optimal quality. 
We review the findings of traditional economie theory on the optimal quality of 
property rights before providing examples of situations where, in apparent contrast 
with the prescriptions of economie theory, partial property rights prevail. Finally, 
we introduce the different chapters of this thesis, each corresponding to one of our 
three essays . 
According to the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO ") 
(2011), 57.4% of the fish stocks assessed were estimated to be fully exploited in 2009. 
These stocks produced catches that were already at or very close to their maximum 
sustainable production. 29.9% were overexploited. The overexploited stocks produ-
ced lower yields than their biological and ecological potential. The maximum eco-
nomie yield, i.e. , the biomass that produces the largest discounted economie profits 
from fishing, generally exceeds the maximum sustainable yield biomass (Gr afton et 
al., 2007) : due to posit ive fishing costs, it is generally not economically effcient 
to reduce the fishing stock down to the maximum sustainable yield biomass. It is 
therefore likely that a vast majority of fish stocks are in fact economically overex-
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ploited. Sorne species are particularly overfished including, but not limited to, one 
third of the tuna species, swordfish, halibut, cod, etc. The overharvesting of rene-
wable resources is not limited to overfishing. According to the FAO (2010), the rate 
of deforestation shows signs of decreasing but remains alarmingly high. Countries 
facing dramatic deforestation include, but are not limited to, Madagascar, Ivory 
Coast, Vietnam, Cambodia, Colombia, Brazil , etc. Finally, numerous species are en-
dangered by illegal hunting including asian elephants, tigers, leopards, etc. These are 
instances where institutions failed to protect natural resources adequately. Defining 
the characteristics of optimal institutions is therefore of primary importance. This 
thesis is a contribution to the understanding of what defines optimal institutions. 
Among various institutions , property rights are perhaps the most fundamental 
as they act both as an incentive for the creation of other institutions in order to 
define and protect them (North, 1990), and as a key explanatory component of 
social and economie behaviors. In fact , as highlighted by Libecap (1989), property 
rights institutions critically affect decision making regarding resource use and hence 
affect economie behavior and performance. Besides, by allocating decision making 
authority, property rights also determine who are the economie actors in a system 
and define the distribution of wealth in a society. We therefore focus our study on 
property rights as an institution and, in particular, on what defines the optimal 
quality of property rights. 
In the literature review in each chapter, we present the most recent and relevant 
advances in the economie theory upon which each chapter builds. Hcre, we simply 
present sorne of the fundamental findings of the economie theory on property rights. 
For infinitely lived agents, in a deterministic economy with complete property rights 
and no market failure, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal provided that 
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the number of agents is fini te. Crucial to the definition of the competitive equilibrium 
is the condition that property rights be complete and perfectly defined. When the 
economy involves the extraction of a renewable resource, the dynamic path of that 
economy and its steady-state equilibrium are also optimal under perfect competition, 
given that perfect competit ion implies complete markets. However, property rights 
on the resource are often missing; open-access leads to overexploitation and the 
tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). 
In many situations, in apparent constrast with the prescriptions of the econo-
mie theory, property rights are neither complete nor absent, but partial. Dupont 
and Grafton (2001) provide an illustration of such a quality of property rights. 
The authors describe a rights-based fishery management system in Nova Scotia in 
which individual quotas ("ITQ") on a share of a total allowable catch ("TAC") co-
exist with a non-ITQ competitive fishing pool on the remaining share of the TAC. 
Hannesson (2004) and Stavins (2011 ) provide other illustrations mentioning fish 
species that migrate between exclusive economie zones - 200 miles from coastlines 
- generally subject to well established rights based management systems, and open 
ocean- beyond the 200 miles limit - where that stock is in common-access. Grain-
ger and Castello (2011) provide further examples of fishing ITQ regimes in New 
Zealand where property rights are insecure either because the species are migrating 
beyond territorial waters or because significant illegal harvesting occurs. The South 
Pars/North Dame gas field provides a non-renewable resource illustration of a com-
bination of well-defined property rights and common-access . The South Pars/North 
Dome gas field is the world's largest gas field, it spans Iranian and Qatari territorial 
waters. Although each country has its own reserve, the field is in common-access 
and encroachments are frequent. Moreover, as discussed in the last essay of this the-
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sis, property rights on income can also be partial. Schoonbrooclt and Tertilt (2010) 
cliscuss how the common law system of the United States and Englancl and the 
Roman-basecl legal system in France allocate a proportion of a chilcl 's income to 
her parents : manclatory parental support or filial responsibility law are instances 
of laws that affect parents' access to an offspring's labor income. Laws regarcling 
chilcllabour are also relevant as they allow (or prevent) parents' access to part of an 
offsprings' lifetime labor income. Laws that give parents control over other aspects 
of their chilclren's lives might also allow parents to control their offspring income in-
clirectly, e.g., by withclrawing consent to marriage unless monetary support is given, 
etc. 
The abject of t his thesis is to specifically answer the following questions : can 
partial property rights be a necessary condition for a first-best optimal exploitation 
of a renewable resource ( essays 1 and 2) or for a first- best optimal accumulation of 
a stock of capital (essay 3)? If so, uncler which circumstances? 
Numerous natural resources are currently overexploitecl. When resources are ove-
rextractecl clue to too weak institutions, strengthening them is necessary but the 
distance to optimal institutions may be shorter than commonly believecl. We show 
it formally under different circumstances. 
Chapter 2 stuclies the optimal quality of property rights in the presence of ex-
ternality and market power. Chapter 3 relaxes the assumption of the existence of 
a market imperfection in the form of market power and consiclers an overlapping 
generations, perfectly competitive, economy in which a renewablc natural resource 
is exploited. We investigate the optimal quality of property rights in this context. In 
Chapter 4, which builcls on Chapter 3, after having explainecl the main differences 
between conventional capital and a natural renewable resource, we investigate the 
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optimal quality of property rights in an economy where capital and labor are used 
in production. We conclude in chapter 5. 
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Chapitre 2 
THE OPTIMAL QUALITY OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITY 
AND MARKET POWER 
2.1 Introduction 
Among various institutions, property rights are perhaps the most fundamental 
as they act both as an incentive for the creation of other institutions (in order to 
define and protect them - North (1990)) and as a key explanatory component of 
social and economie behaviors. In fact , as highlighted by Libecap (1989) , property 
rights institutions critically affect decision making regarding resource use and hence 
affect economie behavior and performance. Moreover, by allocating decision making 
authority, property rights also determine who are the economie actors in a system 
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and define the distribution of wealth in a society. 
There are many instances where property rights are neither perfectly defined nor 
perfectly enforced. Examples include but are not limited to aquifers or rivers, fishe-
ries, hunting, forestry, underground reserves of crude oil, common pastures for cattle 
grazing, dean air, intellectual properties, etc. It is common wisdom among econo-
mists to consider those observed imperfections as either the economically efficient 
outcome from the consideration of definition /enforcement costs1 by the government 
or from necessary, although economically inefficient , negotiated compromises bct-
ween a multitude of economie and political forces pulling in different directions. The 
purpose of this paper is to further investigate that common wisdom. More specifi-
cally, this paper addresses the following question : could there, in fact, be instances 
where, absent any enforcement costs for the government , partial property rights are 
economically efficient? 
We answer this question for a renewable resource as they are frequently charac-
terized by imperfect exclusion and by a limited number of firms permit ted to enter 
the industry. Besicles, they have exhibited monotonically increasing scarcity (Sta-
vins, 2011) and therefore best illustrate the role of property rights; similar rationale 
should apply to non-renewable resource. 
We assume that sorne degree of market power may be present in the industry and 
that society determines the level of completeness of property rights. This could be 
done, as in Becker (1968) , through investments in law enforcement, judicial systems, 
etc. 
1In presence of definition/enforcement costs for the government, the first-order condition for 
optimality rcquires the cquali ty of marginal costs and marginal bcncfits of definition/cnforccmcnt. 
The marginal costs being generally higher than the marginal bcncfits of full complction, the opti-
mality condition is vcrified before clcfinition/cnforcement arc complete (Nostbakkcn, 2008). 
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The basic model employed is one in which firms adopt a Cournot-Nash behavior 
wh en determining their own exploitation effort while considering the quality (or level 
of completeness) of property rights and their assignment to firms as given. We first 
address the existence of a level of completeness of property rights leading to first-
best resource exploitation in presence of market power. Then, considering explicitly 
the quality of property rights as an endogenous variable, we seek to establish an 
analytic expression of that optimal quality under standard assumptions. To do so, 
we use a two stage Stackelberg game involving a social planner (the Stackelberg 
leader) and n profit maximizing firms (the Stackelberg followers) . ln stage one, the 
social planner chooses the quality of the property rights. In stage two , the firms 
adopt a Cournot-Nash behavior considering the quality of property rights as given. 
We show, under standard assumptions , that complete rights are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for efficiency in a resource industry where a limited number of firms 
compete with each other. Partial property rights are found to be efficient in presence 
of market power as long as the number of firms is sufficiently high. We determine 
the relationship between the quality of property rights and the number of firms . We 
show that the optimal quality of property rights increases with the number of firms 
and that when the number of firms is reduced, property rights should optimally 
weaken. This explains what was already noted by Hotelling (1931) : 
"The government of the United States under the present administra-
t ion has withdrawn oil lands from entry in order to conserve this asset, 
and has also taken steps toward prosecuting a group of California oil 
companies for conspiring to maintain unduly high priees, thus restric-
ting production. Though these moves may at first sight appear contra-
dictory in intent, they are really aimed at two distinct evils, a Scylla and 
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Charybdis between which public policy must be steered. 11 
Our results suggest that the numerous instances of imperfectly enforced property 
rights are not necessarily signs of imperfect institutions ; they may in fact reflect an 
adequate adjustment of the quality of property rights. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
examine the literature. Section 2.3 presents the baseline madel. In section 2.4, we 
discuss the existence of an optimal level of property rights completeness in presence 
of market power. In section 2.5, we derive an analytic expression for that optimal 
quality of property rights under standard assumptions and interpret the results. We 
conclude in section 2.6. 
2.2 Relation to the literature 
A large portion of the economie literature considers complete property rights. 
There is a literature on the effects of market power in presence of complete property 
rights on the exploitation of renewable resource (Scott (1955) is a classical reference) 
as well as non renewable resource that include Salant (1976) and Loury (1986). 
There is an extensive literature on situations where property rights are absent 
which includes : a literature related to the tragedy of the commons2 that pertains 
mainly to renewable resource (e.g. , Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968)) , a literature 
on the problem of common exploitation of a renewable resource when individual 
producers wield market power ( e.g. , Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Datta and 
Mirman (1999)). The latter consider for instance the coexistence of market power 
2 Consistent with this strand of the literaturc, the expression "open acccss" and "common acccss " 
arc uscd intcrchangeably in this papcr where the numbcr of firms is fixcd and fini tc. 
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and open access externalities in a model where two groups of countries, differing by 
the resource in open access to which they have access, compete through dynamic 
strategie priee manipulation. In that paper, the foc us is not on the quality of pro-
perty rights as those are assumed absent. There is a literature on the problem of 
common exploitation of a non renewable resource (e.g., Dasgupta and Real (1979)). 
More closely related to this paper is a literature looking for the optimal number 
of oligopoly firms in a common pool renewable resource (see Cornes, Mason et al. 
(1986) for a study in a static context and Mason and Polasky (1997) for a study 
in a dynamic context). In this paper, property rights are present but partial; the 
absence of property rights is only a polar case. 
The rationale of this paper shares sorne common ground with Heintzelman et 
al. (2009) who show that there exists a specifie organization of the fishing indus-
try, partnerships , that can be socially optimal in a common pool resource. In our 
paper, we consider an oligopolistic market structure and show that a first-best so-
cial optimum can be achieved when a resource is partially protected. We show that 
the socially optimal quality of property rights is a function of technology, biology, 
preferences, and the number of firms in an industry. 
There is also a literature in which property rights are partial with an exogenous 
degree of completeness : Bohn and Deacon (2000) is a classical reference which pro-
vides an empirical study of the effect of insecure ownership on ordinary investment 
and natural resource use. 
There is finally a growing literature considering the interaction between trade 
and the quality of property rights in which the property rights are endogenously 
determined (see Hotte, Long and Tian (2000), Copeland and Taylor (2009) as well 
as Tajibaeva (2012)) . Small, priee taking, economies are generally considered. In 
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this paper, we consider a closed economy in which the number of firms is finite . 
Firms have market power and can be both owners and poachers ; poaching occurs 
at the equilibrium and its occurrence can lead to optimal exploitation in presence 
of market power. 
Engel and Fisher (2008) consider how a government should contract with private 
firms to exploit a natural resource where an incentive to expropriate those firms may 
otherwise exist in the good state of the world where profits are high. Engel and Fisher 
consider tl1ree sources of potential inefficiencies : uncertainty, market power and an 
irreversible fixed cost. In this paper, we retain only market power. Castello and 
Kaffine (2008) study the dynamic harvest incentives faced by a renewable resource 
harvester with insecure property rights. A resource concession is granted for a fixed 
duration after which it is renewed with a known probability only if a target stock is 
achieved. They show that complete property rights are sufficient for economically 
efficient harvest but are not necessary. The idea is that if the target stock is set 
sufficiently high, then when the appropriator weights the extra benefit of harvesting 
now against the expected cost of loosing renewal, the appropriator may choose a 
similar path as with infinite tenure and complete rights. They fur ther show that 
there exist a minimum length of tenure that is required to induce the infinite path 
and is a decrea.sing function of a renewal probability and growth rate. They conclude 
by saying : "Next steps in this vein could include combining the appropriator 's 
incentives with the regulator 's objective to design efficient incomplete property rights 
regimes. 11 It is in fact what our simple model offers. This paper differs from Castello 
and Kaffine (2008) and Engel and Fisher (2008) in that the level of completeness 
is the result of benevolent government's decisions and complete rights are no longer 
a sufficient condition for efficiency : complete rights are inefficient in our model. 
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Grainger and Castello (2011) provide an empirical investigation of the impact of 
insecure property rights on the value of fishing quotas in Canada, New Zealand and 
the US. They illustrate the fact that different fishing ITQ regimes translate into 
different strengths of property rights. This paper investigates the impact of those 
different strengths of property rights on the exploitation of the resource in presence 
of market power. 
The resource problem considered in this paper is a second best problem (Lipsey 
and Lancaster , 1956). In an economy where the number of firm is finite and firms 
exercise market power, property rights are established by a social planner that does 
not otherwise control firms. It is shawn that the first best can be achieved by partial 
property rights provided sorne condit ion.· on technology and preferences are satisfied . 
2. 3 The mo del 
2.3.1 Resource, producers, technologies and consumers 
We consider n firms i = 1, ... , n having access to an homogeneous stock S of 
renewable resource. The rate of change of the stock S depends on total harvest H 
and, through a natural growth function G(S), on the stock size : 
S = G(S)- H 
We consider only steady state harvest equilibria, that is equilibria such that : S = 0, 
implying 
G(S) = H (2.1) 
which is the traditional bioeconomic equilibrium equation. 
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Harvesting by firmi , h;(e;, S), depends on its own effort e;, whose unit cost w 
is fixed and exogenous, and on the stock of resource. Total harvest is the sum of 
individual harvests: H = 2.::::~= 1 h;(e;, S). As total harvest is a function of individual 
efforts , equation (2 .1) defines the equilibrium biomass as the implicit function S of 
V = ( e1 , ... , en) the vector of individual efforts : 
S = S(V) 
Noting dhi(ei,S(V)) = Bhi(ei,S(V)) + as(V) Bhi (e, ,S(V)) the individual harvest function 
de, Be; Be; 88 ' 
is increasing in a firm's own effort ~h, 1 _ > 0 as long as the resource stock is 
e, 8>8 
above the maximum sustainable yield level Sand decreasing otherwise. As a result , 
whatever the returns of the harvest functions h; (ei, S) to effort and the resource 
stock, the equilibrium harvest functions h;(e;, S(V)) exhibit diminishing returns 
~ < O. Both efforts and stock are essential to harvesting : h;(O , S) = 0 VS and 
h;(e;, 0) = 0 Ve; . All firms share the same harvesting technology with constant 
returns to effort given any resource stock level : hi(ei, S) = h(e;, S) and 82 1~~fS) = 0 
vi, s. 
Constant returns to efforts given any resource stock level means that h( e;, S) = 
ed(S) and H = Ef(S) with E = L~= l ei and f(S) = h(1 , S). At the steady state 
equilibrium, S = S(E). 
Equation (2.1) is not sufficient to uniquely define H and S. Consumer prefe-
rences, represented by an aggregate inverse demand function P(H) , determine which 
of the pairs (H, S) verifying this equation is economically efficient. In the next sec-
t ion, we define the economically efficient steady state, which under our standard 
assumptions, is unique. 
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2.3.2 Social optimum 
Let the net consumer surplus be C(H ) = U(H )- P(H )H . Let the net producer 
surplus be IT (H ) = P(H)H - w 2::::~= 1 ei · The social welfare W(H) is the sum of 
the consumer and producer surpluses : W(H ) = U(H ) - w I:~ 1 ei · The first-best 
problem is to maximize social welfare by choice of individual efforts : 
H n e~~' 1 P(u)du- w L ei 
t= l 
subject to : 
n 
H = L h(ei, S(E)) 
i=l 
The n first-order conditions for effort are : 
oh as n oh 
P(H) [8e + 8e L as(ej , S(E)) ] = w Vi = 1, .. , n. 
t t j = l 
(2.2) 
At the steady-state equilibrium, t his system uniquely defines the totallevel of efforts 
E* = 2::::~= 1 e; (n) for all n. The individual level of efforts are undetermined3 . A 
solution is ei(n) = e;(n) = ... = e~(n) = e* (n) with e*(n) = ~· . We have : 
P(H*) ~: (E* , S(E*)) = w 
where : 
~:. (E*, S(E*)) = ;~1 (e*(n) , S(E*)) + ~:. t ~~(ej(n) , S(E*)) 
t t t j = l 
The Pareto optimum equilibrium resource stock and harvest are dependent on total 
effort : E* = ne* ( n) only and independent from the number of firms : 
S* = S(E*) Vn; H* = E* f(S(E*)) Vn 
The pair (H*, S* ) defines the socially optimal steady-state with H* = G(S*). 
3 See G. Stevenson (2005) p. 38 on the clru;sic indeterminacy of individual effor ts in presence of 
constant returns to scale at the firm 's leve!. 
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2.4 Existence of efficient property rights 
2.4.1 Property rights 
Property rights are an institution. For a renewable resource, they can be defined 
either on access to the resource or on harvest of the resource. In this section, the 
number of firms with access to the resource is given ; we only consider the harvesting 
rights enjoyed by these firms. These rights may be interpreted as individual quotas. 
Imperfections in these rights may take the form of misreporting and/ or harvest from 
open access stock as opposed to harvest from quotas. 
Hotte et al. (2013) consider situations where bath input exclusion and output 
appropriation are simultaneously present. They show that each of these types of 
property right tends to pull input use in opposite directions. Weak property rights 
on input encourages harvest while weak property rights on output discourages it. In-
deed, the distinction between input and output rights, whenever possible, appears of 
primary importance. However, with most mixed regulatory regimes where rights on 
the input are enforced on the output, the distinction between weak individual quotas 
(generally considered output rights) and weak input exclusion may be blurred. To 
be more precise, in this paper, partial property rights on the output translates into 
partial propcrty rights on labor as an input through a crowding effect : when in-
dividual quotas are partially enforced , they translate into partial self-appropriation 
of firms' efforts and, consistent with Hotte et al. 's conclusions , absent any market 
power, excessive efforts is encouraged and the resource is overharvested. 
As we limit the analysis to steady state equilibria, total harvest, i.e., harvest 
from open access stock and harvest from quotas, must be equal to the natural 
growth of the resource. In other words, only the natural growth of the resource 
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will be harvested at the steady state. For ease of reference, we will thereafter refer 
to the natural growth of the resource as simply "the resource to be harvested" or 
more simply "the resource" , as the flow is proportional to the stock in steady-state 
equilibrium. 
Complete property rights on the resource refer to rights that are defined on the 
entire resource to be harvested and to rights that are perfectly enforceable by the ow-
ner , secure from any seizure or encroachment. Complete property rights imply that 
firms can appropriate their individual quotas fully and can use them for production 
as they wish. Partial property rights may have different interpretations. Three of 
those interpretations are equivalent for the purpose of this paper. According to a 
first interpretation, partial property rights refer to rights that are defined on a share 
only of the resource to be harvested, the rest of the resource being in open access. 
According to a second interpretation , partial property rights are rights defined on 
the entire resource to be harvested but are not fully protected so that firms can 
secure only a share of their individual quotas. According to a third interpretation, 
risk-neutral firms harvest a renewable resource in an uncertain economy where the 
resource is either perfectly protected or in open access. 
Hereafter , we will use the first interpretation as it relates to interesting observed 
situations. In fact, although our madel is highly stylized and fits no specifie resource 
industry, it provides a justification based on efficiency for rights-based resource ma-
nagement systems in which a share of a stock of resource is exploited under individual 
quotas whereas a remaining share is left to competitive common-access exploitation. 
Dupont and Grafton (2001) provide an illustration of such systems in Nova Scotia. 
The authors describe a rights-based fishery management system in which individual 
quotas ("ITQ") on a share of a total allowable catch ("TAC") coexist with a non-
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ITQ competitive fishing pool on the remaining share of the TAC. Hannesson (2004) 
and Stavins (2011) provide other illustrations mentioning fish species that migrate 
between exclusive economie zones- 200 miles from coastlines- generally subject to 
well established rights based management systems, and open ocean - beyond the 
200 miles limit - where that stock is in open access. Grainger and Castello (2011) 
provide further examples of fishing ITQ regimes in New Zealand where property 
rights are insecure either because the species are migrating beyond territorial wa-
ters or because significant illegal harvesting occurred. The South Pars/North Dome 
gas field provides a non-renewable resource illustration of a combination of well-
defined property rights and open access. The South Pars/North Dome gas field is 
the world's largest gas field, it spans lranian and Qatari territorial waters. Although 
each country has its own reserve, the field is in common-access and encroachments 
are frequent. 
We call B an indicator of the quality (or level of completeness) of property rights 
on the resource with B E [0, 1]. We consider that property rights are defined (i.e., 
quotas are attributed to the firm) on a share (1 - B) of the resource and that a 
share B is in common access. Each firm is attributed a share f3i of the resource to 
be harvested. We have 2:.~= 1 (3i = (1 - B). The polar cases B = 0 and B = 1 can 
be interpreted as follows : () = 0 corresponds to a situation where property rights 
are complete; we have L-: 1 f3i = 1 which means that the sum of all attributed 
and perfectly enforced quotas is equal to the total amount of resource harvested at 
the steady state (i.e., the natural growth of the resource) . () = 1 corresponds to a 
situation where property rights are absent, no quotas are attributed : 2:.~1 f3i = 0 
and the total amount of resource harvested is in common access. Interior values of 
() mean that perfectly enforced property rights are defined on a share (1 - B) of the 
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resource and that a share e of the resource is in open access . The total resource in 
open access is then BG(S). For the previously mentioned reasons, private or public 
costs of enforcement are ignored. If we were to adopt the second interpretation of the 
quality of property rights, we would assume that quotas are attributed on the entire 
resource so that each firm receives Pi of the resource with 2::::~ 1 Pi = 1 and that only 
a share (1 - e) of each quota is perfectly protected while a share e is not protected. 
Then, as in the first interpretation , the total amount of resource protected would 
also be (1 - B)G(S) and the amount of resource in open access BG(S). One may 
interpret piG(S) as the legal, but not necessarily enforced or effective, property rights 
and (3iG( S) = (1- B)piG(S) as the effective (or economie) property rights. They 
coïncide and refiect the same reality when property rights are perfectly defined (i.e. 
e = 0). In any instances, rational economie agents' decisions are based on economie 
(or effective) property rights only.4 If we were to adopt the third interpretation, e 
would represent the probability that the resource falls in open access. As previously 
mentioned , we adopt thereafter t he first interpretation. 
The firms compete for the resource in common access. As in Gordon (1954) and 
subsequent literature, we assume that the share of the total resource in common 
access that each firm appropriates, is a positive function of its harvesting efforts 
and a negative function of the combined harvesting efforts from otl1ers. We call 
ll! (ei, zn..~.i ej) this function. The literature endows it with the following properties: 
.7-r 
it is twice continuously differentiable, with 'Ill ( ei) z ;fi ej ) > 0) '11 2 ( ei) z ;fi ei ) < 0, 
Wn (ei,:L71 ieJ ) < 0, w(o,z ;fie)) = 0 ; individual shares in the common access 
4 As highlighted by Pande and Udry (2007) , studies consistently show that there is a crit ical 
dist inction between legal and effective sccurity of property rights and that effective and individual 
economie bchavior arc jointly determined. A more in-depth discussion of the concept of effective 
property rights can be found in Grossman (2001 ). 
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resource must sum to unity, so that 2:::= ~= 1 'l'(ei, 2:=7o~i ej) = 1. Renee, as in Gordon 
(1954) and subsequent literature, ei serves both to harvest and appropriate the 
resource. 
The harvest of finn i must verify h(ei, S(E)) ~ (3iG(S) + 'l!(ei, 2:=7ii ej )OG(S). 
Substituting H = G(S) at the steady-state equilibrium gives 
n 
h(ei, S(E)) = (3i H + 'l!( ei, L ej )OH 
#i 
(2.3) 
Summing across n, and recalling t hat 2:::= ~= 1 (3i = (1-0) and 2:::=~= 1 'l'(ei, 2:=7ii ej ) = 1, 
shows that the condition H = L~=l h(ei, S(E)) is verified. 
For the polar case of common access (i.e. , e = 1) , firm i 's harvest must be equal 
to 'l'(ei, 2:=7ii ej)G(S). For the polar case of complete rights protection (i.e., e = 0), 
firm i's harvest is limited to (3iG(S) , its individual quota. For the general case of 
incomplete rights 0 E [0 , 1], firm i's harvest is given by equation (2.3). 
2.4.2 The firms' Cournot-Nash game 
Each firm determines its harvesting effort considering as given the harvesting 
efforts of other firms , as well as the number of firms and the quality of property 
rights. Firm i's problem is : 
max IIi= P(H)h(ei, S(E))- wei (2.4) 
e i 
subject to (2.3). 
The polar cases e = 1 and e = 0 Assume that property rights are absent as 
in models of the commons. Then, e = 1 leading to f3i = 0 for alli. Equation (2.3) 
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becomes: 
n 
h(ei , S(E)) = w(ei, L ej )H 
jf.i 
and firm i's problem becomes : 
n 
maxii · = P(H)w(e· 2: e )H- we 
' ', J 7, 
e i jf.i 
(2.5) 
If w ( ei, ""E,~t#i ej ) is given the standard functional form : W ( ei, ""E,7#i ej) = L,j':
1 
ei , th en 
equation (2.5) is identical to equation (4) in Cornes et al. (1986). In that article, the 
authors determine the number of firms that equates the quilibrium harvest under 
oligopoly with the (unique) Pareto optimal harvest. We will refer to that number as 
fi the 11 optimal number of firms in pure common-access 11 • 
Let e = 0 ; this corresponds to complete property rights, ""E,~ 1 f3i = 1. The 
objective (2.4) is unchanged, but constraint (2.3) becomes h(ei, S(E)) = f3 iH. The 
problem collapses to the traditional textbook version of the firm's problem in a 
Cournot oligopoly. 
The general casee E [0 , 1] With partial property rights, the first-order condition 
to the maximization of (2.4) subject to (2.3) is : 
(2.6) 
where : 
We call f(ei; e, n) the left-hand side of equation (2.6 ); f (ei ; e, n ) is the marginal 
revenue in presence of partial property rights. The right-hand side of the equation is 
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the marginal cost. Note that parameters () and n are outside the control of individual 
firms. This problem is consistent with different vectors of f3i i = 1, ... , n; to each 
vector may correspond5 different ash equilibria. Consider the symmetric solution 
to system (2.6) when f3i = f3 = 1 ~0 V i . At the symmetric Nash equilibrium, the 
level of input extended by each firm is ê(() ; n) implicit ly defined by : 
r (ê; e,n) =w ve E [0, 1] (2 .7) 
Proposition 2.1 When the number of oligopolistic firms is strictly above the op-
timal number fi of firms in pure common-access, there exists a quality of property 
rights ()* with 1 > ()* > 0 such that the harvesting efforts chosen by the oligopolistic 
firms at the Nash equilibrium sum up to the first-best industry leveZ : nê(B*) = E* . 
Proof. r is a continuously differentiable function of ê and () so that, applying t he 
implicit function theorem to (2 .7), there exists a continuous function ê(() ; n) over 
the interval [ 0, 1] su ch th at : 
ê = ê((); n) V() E [0, 1] 
The Pareto-optimal number of firms fi in pure common-access is defined by the 
condit ion fiê (1; fi ) = E * which is a restatem nt of Cornes et al. (1986) 's findings in 
terms ofproperty rights quality. From Cornes et al. (1986) , we know that , for all n hi-
gher than fi, individual efforts from the oligopolistic firms in the absence of property 
rights will be higher than the optimal level of efforts : ê ( 1; n) > e* ( 1; fi) , Vn > fi. 
Hence : 
nê(1;n) > E* ,Vn > fi 
5 For additional al:ll:lumptionl:l on the inveŒe demand function enl:luring the existence and the 
unicity of the Nai:>h cquilibrium, sec Gaudet and Sala,nt (1991) . 
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For all n higher than fi, in presence of perfect property rights ( e = 0) , oligopolistic 
firms, competing à la Cournot , will provide a lower level of efforts than optimal : 
nê(O;n) < E *,'ï!n > fi 
As ê(e ; n) is a continuous function of e over [0, 1], the intermediate value theorem 
implies that, wh en n > fi , there exist s a value of e) e·) su ch that 1 > e· > 0 and 
nê(8* ; n) = E* , 'ï!n >fi. 
This is a fairly general result which does not rely on the particular functional form 
of r as long as a Nash equilibrium exists and as long as r is continuous in both ê 
and e . • 
Corollary 2 .1.1 When the number of oligopolistic firms is strictly above the Pareto 
optimal number of firms in pure common-access, complete property rights e = 0 
and the absence of property rights e = 1 bath lead to socially inefficient levels of 
harvesting effo rts. 
Proof. The result follows from nê(1; n) > E* and nê(O ; n) < E *, 'ï!n > fi . • 
2.5 Efficient property rights 
Consider a social planner who seeks to establish adequate property rights in order 
to maximize welfaré. She cannot choose directly the efforts but she can choose, as 
6 In doing so, wc do not imply that t he quality of propcrty rights is an handily availablc policy 
instrument to govcrnmcnts . The social planncr is uscd as a conccptual tool to defi ne the efficient 
quali ty of propcrty rights . Wc do not addrcss the question as to whcthcr that quali ty is rcachcd 
by society nor how. One may think that it may be rcachcd by society through an evolution of 
ncgotiat ions and compromises, laws and regulations, public invcstmcnts in the judiciary system 
and laws cnforccmcnt, etc. 
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Stackelberg leader, the quality of the property rights () at no cost1. 
The situation is modelled as follows : given the property rights , it is assumed that 
firms compete in a Cournot-Nash game to determine their efforts. Each firm takes 
the efforts of others and the property rights quality as given when determining its 
own efforts. The social planner acts as a Stackelberg leader in choosing the quality of 
property rights taking into account the outcome of the firms' Nash-Cournot game. 
Firms act as Stackelberg followers with respect to property rights. 
The solution must be subgame-perfect. The problem of input choice by the firms 
was shown to be a Nash equilibrium in the previous section. We now consider the 
problem of the social planner. 
2.5.1 The social planner's problem as Stackelberg leader 
The analysis of the previous section indicates that the first-best is attainable 
via an appropriate choice of property rights quality ; the optimum property rights 
quality ()* E [0, 1] must be such that : 
E* = nê(B*) (2.8) 
where E* is implicitly defined by equation (2 .2) and e(()) is defined implicitly by 
equations (2. 7). So ()* must be solution to the following system : 
{ 
f(ê; e, n) = P(H*) ~:. (E* , S*) 
e*(n) = ê(B*; n) 
subject to ()* E [0, 1] and (2.3). 
7 As previously mentioned , the consideration of positive complction costs for the government 
would simply reinforce the argument . 
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Proposition 2.2 The optimal quality of property rights is : 
e* 1 tc =tc+---
1 - nto 
(2.9) 
where tD is the priee elasticity of market demand at (E*,H*), tc is the effort elas-
ticity of harvest at (E*, H*) and n is the number of firms. 
Proof. See Appendix A • 
Interestingly, this result has an intuitive interpretation : as will be further explai-
ned thereafter, tc can be regarded as a measure of the common-access externality 
whereas __!_ , i.e. , the Lerner index, measures the extent of the inefficiency resulting Eo 
from the presence of market power. Equation (2.9) provides that the optimal quality 
of property rights must be such that those two inefficiencies offset each other for any 
given number of firms. B* ( n) is solution to the ·ocial planner's problem. We note that 
B* is a function of n and, as mentioned in Proposition 1, the constraint B* E [0, 1] 
is binding for sorne values of n relative to technology and preferences . The analytic 
expression of the condition of existence is studied in the following paragraph. 
2.5.2 Analytic expression of the condition of existence 
We have to verify 1 2: B* = Ec + l~n fE~ 2: O. B* 2: 0 is always verified as 
Eo(1 - n) > 0 and Ec > O. On the other hand, as shown in Appendix B, B* ~ 1 is 
verified if and only if : 
tc 
n >n= 1+----
- (tc- 1) tD 
(2.10) 
n is the Pareto optimal number of firms in pure common-access. It is identical to 
the optimal number of firms found in equation ( 4) of Cornes et al. (1986) 's article. 
It is the number of firms which, in the absence of property rights (B = 1) leads to 
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the first-best level ofharvesting effort for given technology (cc) and preferences (c0 ). 
In other words, equation (2.10) provides an analytic expression of the condition of 
existence in P roposition 1. 
2.5.3 Interpretation of ()* 
As soon as n ;:::: fi = 1 + (e, ~l)ev, we have 1 > B* > O. The result B* > 0 means 
that complete property rights are inefficient. Part ial property rights are efficient . 
Partial open access to t he resource compensates in part for the under exploitation 
by the oligopoly. The result B* < 1 means that partial property r ights do better 
than no rights at all. It means tha t despite being weakly enforceable, the rights still 
a ttenuate the overexploitation of the resource. 
Impact of the priee elasticity of market demand Ev 
Proposition 2.3 Everything else the same, the more priee inelastic m arket de-
m and, the more partial optimal property rights need to be. 
Proof. g:; = (n- leJ,[evJ2 > 0 as Ec > 0 and n > 1. • 
It means that the lower the degree of buyers' responsiveness to priee, the more 
oligopolistic firms can exercise their market power , the more partial optimal property 
rights must be to stimulate production. The more firms acquire market power , the 
less complete property rights should be to encourage production to optimallevel. 
Impact of the total effort elasticity of production E, 
Proposition 2.4 Everything else the same, the higher the total effort elasticity of 
production, the more partial optimal property rights need to be. 
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ae· 1 Proof. -8 = 1 + -(1- ) - > O. • fe -n f. D 
aHI (H*) Using the definition of Ec , we can write ~ = Ec E* . Therefore, Ec can be 
e1. E* ,S* 
regarded as a measure of the distance between the average product ( ~: ) and margi-
nal ( ~H 1 ) product . As Ec < 1, the higher Ec , the doser the average and marginal 
et E * ,S* 
products are, the weaker is the intensity of the commons problem and therefore the 
more partial property rights must be to stimulate production. The distance between 
average and marginal costs will be greater in industries with significant economies 
of scale. In those industries, our results suggest that stronger (although partial) 
property rights are sufficient to offset market power. 
Impact of the relative value of input and output 
Corollary 2.4.1 Everything else the sam e, the greater the ratio between input costs 
and the market-value of output, the more partial optimal property rights need to be. 
Reciprocally, the lower the ratio between input costs and market-value of output, the 
more complete optimal property rights must be. 
Proof. We have Ec = ~: ( ~H 1 ) .Using equation (2.2) , the total effor t elasticity 
et E* ,S* 
of production can be rewritten as Ec = ~: P(% • ) and we recall that ~~: > O. • 
The rationale is the following : the lower the ratio between input costs and 
market-value of output, the more distant P (H *) H * and wE* are, the higher firms' 
profits from exploiting the resource, the greater the intensity of the commons pro-
blems8, the more complete property rights must be; in other words, stronger (al-
though partial) property rights suffice to optimally offset market power. According 
8 As the participation constra int is vcrificd at the first-bcst cquil ibrium (i.e., firms profi ts arc 
posit ive) , wc have ~: P (~r · ) < 1, thcrcforc the more distant P(H *)H * and wE* arc, the lowcr is 
Ec at (E* , H *) and strongcr is the intcnsity of the corn mons problcm. 
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to Demsetz (1967) : 11 property rights develop to internalize externalities when the 
gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. Increased in-
ternalization results from changes in economie values, changes which stem from the 
development of new technology and the opening of new markets, changes to which 
the old property rights are poorly atuned. 11 To support his theory, Demsetz dis-
eusses the close relationship between the development of private property rights in 
land among American Indians and the development of commercial fur trade. In this 
paper, we build on Demsetz's (1967) findings and explain how the outcome of the 
development of property rights, as a consequence of changes in economie values, is 
affected by the presence of market power : the more valuable is the output compared 
to the input , the greater the profits, the more intense is the commons problem and 
stronger partial property rights should be to offset market power. 
Impact of biology and resource technology 
Corollary 2.4.2 Everything else the same, the lower the impact of efforts on stock 
leveZ, the more partial optimal property rights must be and, the lower is the total 
efforts elasticity of resource stock, the more complete optimal property rights must 
be. 
Proof. Ec = 2: ~H 1 can be rewritten as 
e., E• ,S• 
,, ~ !: ~~ (e'(n), S')+ ( ~: ~:. (e'(n), S')) ( ~: t ~~ (ej (n) , S')) 
We call Wc = 2: g~ ( e* (n ), S*) the partial effort elasticity of production at (E*, H*), 
r; c = ~: g:, ( e* ( n), S*) the effort elastici ty of the resource stock at ( E* , S*) and 
çc = %: 'E7=1 g~(ej(n),S*) the resource stock elasticity of production at (S* ,H*). 
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We have: 
and 8'" = çc > 0, 8'" = TJ < O. arr > 0, therefore arr > 0 and ao· < O. • 817, 8ç, c 8e, 811, 8ç, 
The lower is the impact of efforts on resource stock, the weaker is the intensity 
of the commons problem and therefore the more partial property rights must be 
to optimally offset market power. The greater is the resource stock elasticity of 
production, the more intense is t he commons problem, the more complete optimal 
property rights must be to offset market power. 
Impact of the number of firms n 
Proposition 2.5 The greater is the number of firms, the more complete optimal 
property rights should be. Reciprocally, a decrease in the number of firms must be 
compensated by more partial optimal property rights. 
Proof. 88°* = -( 
1
1)2 ~ < 0 as Eo < O. • n n- f. D 
This is a formal illustration of the Hotelling's Scylla and Charybdis dilemma : 
a government that decreases the number of firms thereby increasing existing firms' 
market power must compensate that increase in market power by letting property 
rights become more partial (hence not let ting oligopolistic firms act as oligopolists) . 
2. 6 Con cl us ion 
We have seen, under standard assumptions, that, even in the absence of comple-
t ion and enforcement costs for the government , partial property rights can be efficient 
in presence of market power. This is consistent with the existence of mixed regu-
latory j property rights regimes such as in sorne Nova Scotia fisheries , in sorne New 
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Zealand ITQ regimes or in the South Pars/North Dome gas field. The determination 
of an analytic expression of that optimal quality of property rights has highlighted 
its main determinants. Greater buyer 's responsiveness to priee is consistent with 
more complete optimal property rights ; in other words , when consumers can police 
activities of oligopolistic firms through demand, the need for resource competition 
among firms is lower. Reciprocally, weaker protection of property rights by society 
can compensate weaker control of firms by consumers. Technology is an important 
determinant of the optimal quality of property rights. The dependence of the optimal 
quality of property rights to technology can also be regarded as a dependence to the 
relative priee of output and input. The more valuable is output compared to input , 
the more complete property rights must be. Our results are consistent with Demsetz 
(1967) 's findings on the emergence of property rights : property rights develop to 
internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the 
cost of internalization. In fact , we build on Demsetz (1967) 's findings and explain 
how the outcome of the development of property rights , as a consequence of changes 
in economie values, is affected by the presence of market power : the more valuable 
is the output compared to the input, the greater the profits, the more intense is the 
commons problem and stronger partial property rights should be to offset market 
power. 
Biology impacts the optimal quality of property rights : when the stock of re-
source is more sensitive to harvesting effor ts, optimal property rights can be more 
complete. Our results also confirm Hotelling's intuition of the existence of a tension 
between the number of firms and the optimal quality of property rights. 
Several additional extensions remain. An investigation of the first-best optima-
lity of partial property rights with other market imperfections may be of interest. 
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The second-best optimality of partial property rights in presence of multiple mar-
ket imperfections is also worth studying. Finally, a formal study of the dynamic 
t rajectory of the quality of property rights leading to its opt imal steady-state may 
complement fruitfully the findings of this paper . 
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Chapitre 3 
OVERLAPPING 
GENERATIONS, NATURAL 
RESOURCES AND THE 
OPTIMAL QUALITY OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
3.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates the merits for a renewable resource economy to have par-
t ial property rights. We show that, in a perfectly competit ive economy where agents 
live finite lives, optimal institutions should make it possible to infringe on a resource 
stock. The quality of property rights on the resource is defined as the proportion 
of the resource that can be appropriated rather than left under open access. The 
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answers are important for policy : when natural resources are overextracted as a 
result of too weak institutions, the distance to optimal institutions may be shorter 
than commonly believed. 
For infinitely lived agents, in a deterministic economy with complete property 
rights and no market failure , the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal provided 
that the number of agents is finite. Crucial to the definition of the competitive 
equilibrium is the condition that property rights be complete and perfectly defined. 
When the economy involves the extraction of a renewable resource, the dynamic 
path of that economy and its steady-state equilibrium are also optimal under perfect 
competition, given that perfect competition implies complete markets. The optimal 
steady-state is stable. However property rights on the resource are often missing; 
open access leads to overexploitation and the tragedy of the commons. 
With overlapping generations (OLG) models, the situation is different. Whether 
or not a renewable natural resource is exploited, the steady-state equilibrium of a 
perfectly competitive OLG economy need not be Pareto efficient. The first theorem of 
welfare may fail to apply because there is an infinite number of finitely lived agents. 
However, not every equilibrium is inefficient. Efficiency is linked to the marginal 
productivity of capital; the Cass criterion (Cass, 1972) gives necessary and sufficient 
conditions for efficiency. The possibility of inefficiency arises from the fact that the 
competitive growth equilibrium of an OLG economy may involve excessive savings. 
In an OLG economy using a renewable resource, excessive savings would take the 
form of insufficient harvesting and has been shown to be possible (Kemp and Long, 
1979 ; Koskela et al., 2002). 
This paper formally investigates these Pareto inefficiencies in terms of the quality 
of property rights. In an overlapping generations model with quasi-linear preferences 
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and a strictly concave renewable-resource growth function, we show that t here always 
exists a quality of property rights that leads to optimal steady-state extraction and 
resource stock level. Under standard assumptions on preferences, technology, and 
resource dynamics, we establish the optimal steady-state quality of property rights 
and show that the steady-state is saddle stable. Our analytical results are illustrated 
by numerical calculations. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 examines the literature. Section 3.3 
presents the basic structure of the model. Section 3.4 characterizes the competitive 
equilibrium. In section 3.5, the conditions of existence, the number of decentralized 
steady-states and the local stability properties of those equilibria are studied. Section 
3.6 provides a characterization of the efficient steady-state. Section 3.7 studies the 
existence of an optimal quality of property rights and determines its expression as 
a function of technology, preferences and stock dynamics. Numerical calculations 
with parametric specifications and a graphie analysis are presented in section 3.8. 
We conclude in the last section of this chapter. 
3.2 Relation to the literature 
Our analysis builds on two major strands of the economies literature. One ad-
dresses the question of whether complete property rights are necessary to optimally 
exploit a natural resource (Engel and Fisher, 2008; Castello and Kaffine, 2008). The 
other strand considers the question of efficiency and/ or equity in the exploitation of 
a natural resource when agents have finite lives and different generations coexist. In 
this latter strand, extensively reviewed by Farmer and Bednar-Friedl (2010), pro-
perty rights are considered either complete (Kemp and Long, 1979 ; Mourmouras , 
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1991; Olson and Knapp, 1997; Koskela et al., 2002, Brechet and Lambrecht , 2011) , 
absent (Mirman and To, 2005 ; Karp and Rezai, 2013) or partial (Balestra et al., 
2010). Finally, in an OLG model with endogenous fertility and without a natural 
resource, Schoonbrodt and Tertilt (2010) and (2013) investigate whether children 
should have property rights on their entire labor income. 
Engel and Fisher (2008) consider how a government should contract with pri-
vate firms to exploit a natural resource where an incentive to expropriate those 
firms exists in the good state of the world where profits are high. Engel and Fisher 
consider three sources of potential inefficiencies : uncertainty, market power and an 
irreversible fixed cast. This paper considers a perfectly competitive economy with 
no market failure. Costello and Kaffine (2008) study the dynamic harvest incentives 
faced by a renewable resource harvester with insecure property rights. A resource 
concession is granted for a fixed duration after which it is renewed with a known pro-
bability only if a target stock is achieved. They show that complete property rights 
are sufficient for economically efficient harvest but are not necessary. The idea is 
that if the target stock is set sufficiently high, then when the appropriator weighs 
the extra benefit of harvesting now against the expected cast of losing renewal, the 
appropriator may choose a similar path to infinite tenure and complete rights. This 
paper differs from Engel and Fisher (2008) and Costello and Kaffine (2008) in that 
complete rights are no longer a sufficient condition for efficiency : complete rights 
can be inefficient. In chapter 2, we show that incomplete property rights can be 
optimal in the presence of market power : the optimal quality of property rights 
depend on the number of firms, on technology through the elasticity of input pro-
ductivity and on preferences through the priee elasticity of demand. That paper is 
in partial equilibrium and is essentially static . The present paper characterizes the 
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steady-state equilibria of an OLG economy, studies its dynamic stability properties 
and compares competitive and efficient steady-state equilibria. 
Using an OLG model with complete property rights, Kemp and Long (1979) de-
monstrate that a competitive economy with constant population may under-harvest 
a renewable resource as a consequence of the resource being inessential for produc-
tion. They assume constant resource growth. Mourmouras (1991) considers interac-
tions between capital accumulation and natural exploitation in Diamond's (1965) 
overlapping generations model. He shows that both a low rate of resource rege-
neration relative to population growth and a low level of savings may lead to the 
unsustainable use of a renewable resource, despite the existence of complete property 
rights. In this paper , complete property rights are not assumed; property rights can 
be complete, absent or partial. The quality of property rights is an institutional pa-
rameter taken as given by individual agents. The natural resource is assumed to be 
essential for production and a strictly concave renewable resource-growth function is 
assumed. Kemp and Long (1979) and Mourmouras (1991) studied the steady-state 
without analyzing its dynamics and stability whereas this paper does study the dy-
namics of the system. Olson and Knapp (1997) analyze competitive allocations of an 
exhaustible resource in an OLG economy and characterize the behavior of resource 
extractions and priees when they are endogenously determined by preferences and 
technology. 
Our model and methodology are similar to the renewable resource model and 
the approach of Koskela et al. (2002). However, in the paper by Koskela et al., pro-
perty rights are not the focus of the analysis and are assumed complete. Our model 
explicitly considers the role of the quality of the property rights in the dynamics of 
the economy : resource extraction and priee paths evolve endogenously considering 
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the quality of property rights at each date. Our model admits the model of Koskela 
et al. (2002) as a special case when property rights are assumed complete in each 
period. Brechet and Lambrecht (2011 ) consider an overlapping generations economy 
in which firms' technology is CES and combines labor , physical capital and a na-
tural resource. They consider an economy in which households have a warm glow 
resource bequest motive. They shed light on the interplay between the resource be-
quest motive and the substitutabilityjcomplementarity relationship between capital 
and the natural resource in the determination of the use of the resource at the equi-
librium. In this paper, consistent with the traditional walrasian representation of 
a perfectly competitive market, we do not assume intergenerational altruism nor a 
bequest motive : agents care only about their own lifetime welfare. 
In contrast with the previous literature, Mirman and To (2005) consider an 
OLG model where property rights on the renewable resource are absent. Young 
agents use the extracted resource as a vehicle for savings and have market power 
on the resource market. Our model is also an OLG model and agents also use 
the non-extracted resource as savings vehicle; however, save for the possibility of 
incomplete property rights on the resource, the economy is perfectly competitive 
for all generations. Karp and Rezai (2013) use a two-sectors OLG model, with 
log linear addit ive intertemporal utility, to study the intergenerational effects of 
a tax that protects a renewable resource in open access. The old agents benefit 
from the environmental improvement (i.e., increase in the steady state level of stock 
and extraction) resulting from the tax. Absent a transfer, the tax harms the young 
agents by decreasing their real wages. They show that a Pareto improving tax can be 
implemented under various political economy settings. In this paper, there is only 
one sector, and property rights exist on the renewable resource but their quality 
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is to be determined. The absence of property rights is only an extreme case of 
our model. Although our results with incomplete rights bear sorne similarity with 
those of Karp and Rezai (2013), incomplete property rights differ from Pigovian 
taxes in the sense that the quality of property rights, as an institution, is not a 
handily available policy instrument ; it is a durable, secular characteristic of an 
economy. Although, as underlined by Copeland and Taylor (2009), they are not an 
immutable characteristic of an economy, their dynamics may still be thought of as 
slow-motioned, short-term stationary; the quality of property rights cvolvcs as a 
result of long-term decisions such as public investments in the judiciary system, law 
enforcement, negotiations, compromises and cultural changes. Moreover, unlike the 
Pigovian tax, weak property rights do not involve the collection, management, or 
redistribution by the government of the share of goods that failed to be appropriated. 
Balestra et al. (2010) investigate the optimal number of plots (or property rights) 
to maximize the stock of a natural resource whose evolution depends on both spa-
tial spillovers amongst private owners (the higher the number of plots the less likely 
spatial spillovers occur) and maintenance cost of each plot (the higher the num-
ber of plots, the smaller the plots, the lower the maintenance cost of each plot). 
They consider an overlapping generations model with a renewable resource where 
a government decides the division of the resource in plots at each date. Each plot 
is assigned to a community that must manage it. Within each community, a re-
presentative young harvests and a representative old owns the capital (in the form 
of extracted resource). There are two sources of market power : as in Mirman and 
To (2005) , within each community, the young has a form of market power as she 
decides how much to harvest taking into account the equilibrium of the produc-
tion inputs market where she meets her contemporaneous old; the second source 
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of market power is the different communities playing a Cournot-Nash game. The 
authors compare the non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes and show that the 
gain from cooperation is remarkable. They study how a fiscal policy could decen-
tralize the cooperative outcome. In this paper, the economy is perfectly competitive 
and the natural resource growth function meets standard assumptions (i.e., no bio-
logical spillovers are assumed) : for instance, a logistic growth function meets our 
assumptions on the resource growth. 
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2013) question the economie rationale of pronatalist 
policies. They consider an OLG model where capital and labor are inputs in produc-
tion, with fertility choice and parental altruism. When the cost of bearing children 
is positive, they show that parents' appropriation of children's income is rendered 
necessary to have a non-zero equilibrium fertility. This paper considers a renewable 
resource economy where property rights on the resource stock can be partial. 
3.3 The model 
We use a standard OLG model similar to the one used by Koskela et al. (2002). 
Our assumptions allow us to use Koskela et al. 's model as a benchmark when 
property rights are complete at all dates . We consider an overlapping generations 
economy without population growth where agents live for two periods and work 
only when young. We assume that agents max:imize the intertemporally additive, 
quasi-linear lifetime utility function : 
(3.1) 
with u2 (c2 ) = c2 where c~ denotes the period i = 1, 2 consumption of a consumer-
worker born at time t and j3 = 1!8 with 6 being the exogenous rate of time pre-
43 
ference. For the first-period utility function , u' > 0, u" < 0, and limc ..... oo u'(c) = 0 
and limc ..... o u'(c) = oo. The young are endowed with one unit of labor, which they 
supply inelastically to firms in the consumption goods sector. Labor earns a com-
petitive wage. The representative young consumer-worker uses the wage to buy the 
consumption good and to buy the stock of renewable resource that remains after 
production as savings to be used during her retirement . In addition to trading in the 
resource market, the young can also participate in the financial market by borrowing 
or lending1 . The representative old rentier sells the stock of renewable resource and 
the financial assets bought when she was young to buy the consumption good during 
her retirement. 
The representative firm produces the consumption good under a constant re-
turns to scale technology that transforms the harvested resource Ht and labor Lt 
into output : F(Ht, Lt)· The technology can be expressed in factor-intensive form 
as f(ht) = F(~;L,) with the standard properties J' > 0 and J" < O. Further-
more, we assume that the Inada conditions are verified : limh ..... o J' (ht) = oo and 
limh ..... oo J'(ht) = 0, where ht is the per capita harvest. The assumption of a repre-
sentative firm is not restrictive because with constant returns to scale, the number 
of firms does not matter and production is independent on the number of firms 
which use the same technology. Moreover, since the firm has constant returns to 
scale technology, profits are zero in equilibrium. Also, as noted by De la Croix and 
Michel (2002) , we may assume that firms live forever. This would not change the 
results as the firm's problem in any case is a static one. 
1The second vehicle for savings is not necessary for our demonstration. It is introduced to 
streamline the presentation and render explicit the underlying arbi trage condi t ion bctween the 
rcsource and the financial asscts. 
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The growth of the renewable resource is g(xt), where Xt denotes the beginning of 
period t per capita stock of the resource; g(xt) is strictly concave and there are two 
values x= 0 and x= x for which g(O) = g(x) = O. Consequently, there is a unique 
value x at which g'(x) = 0, where x denotes the stock providing the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). A logistic growth function g(x) = ax- ~bx2 meets these 
assumptions. 
The renewable resource in this model has two roles. It is both a savings vehicle 
between generations and an input in the production of a consumption good. The 
market for the resource operates in the following manner. At the beginning of period 
t the old agent owns the stock Xt ; the stock increases by the current growth to 
Xt + g(xt)· If property rights are complete, she sells the stock (growth included) to 
the firm , which then chooses the harvest ht to be used as input in the production of 
the consumption good. The firm then sells the remaining resource stock Xt+l to the 
young, who becomes the old agent in the next period . The firm only plays the role 
of an intermediary between the generations; it does not extract any surplus from 
its activities . Surpluses are allocated between the generations by the priee system. 
With complete property rights, the natural growth of the resource yields a profit 
for its owner. The transition equation for the resource is : 
(3.2) 
where ht denotes the resource stock harvested by the firm for use as an input in 
production. The initial stock Xt and its growth , g(xt) , can be put aside to feed into 
next period's stock or used to contribute to the current period's harvest. 
Let et E [0, 1] be an indicator for the quality of property rights on the resource 
owned by the old agent at date t with et = 1 corresponding to complete rights and 
et = 0 corresponding to the absence of property rights. All other property rights in 
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the economy are assumed complete. When property rights on the stock of resource 
are partial, the firm can harvest a proportion of the resource owned by the old agent 
without paying for it . At the beginning of period t the old agent owns the stock Xt ; 
the stock increases by the current growth to Xt + g(xt)· The finn appropriates for 
free a proportion (1- et) of the quantity of resource ht it harvests for production and 
buys the rest of the quantity it needs, eht , from its owner at the going resource priee 
Pt · Then, the remaining resouree stock, a quantity of Xt- ht + g(xt ), is transmitted 
to the next generation at priee Pt· Altogether the old thus obtains the amount 
Pt (xt- (1- e) ht + g(xt )) from the resource; the firm harvests the quantity ht at 
cost Ptetht; the young receives a quantity Xt+ l = Xt + g(xt)- ht which she pays to the 
old at the market priee Pt out of her wage income Wt· et is exogenous to individuals 
and firms. 
The periodic budget constraints are thus : 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
where Rt+l = 1 + rt+ l is the return factor on the financial asset and St represents 
savings by the young on the financial market. At the equilibrium, St will be zero 
so that the resource is the only savings vehicle. According to equation (3.4) , the 
old agent consumes her savings, including the interest and the income she gets 
from selling the resouree. From equations (3.3) and (3.4), the intertemporal budget 
constraint is : 
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3.4 Competitive equilibrium 
To study the competitive equilibrium, we follow De la Croix and Michel (2002)'s 
approach and distinguish the temporary equilibrium and the inter-temporal equili-
brium. 
3.4.1 Temporary equilibrium 
The temporary equilibrium of period t is a competitive equilibrium given priee 
expectations. It is such that : (i) the representative agent optimizes her lifetime 
utility subject to both her budget constraint in each period and her priee expecta-
tions, and, (ii) all markets clear at period t. The temporary equilibrium gives the 
equilibrium value of the current variables, including current priees as a function of 
the past and of the expectations about the future. 
Consumptions at each period ci and c~ by an individual of generation t and the 
demand for the resource stock as savings Xt+l , are determined as a solution to the 
following utility 's maximization problem : 
max u( ci) + (3c~ 
c~ , c~,Xt+ 1 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (3.5). It gives the following first-
order conditions for ci, c~ and Xt+l at the interior solution with À a non-negative 
47 
multiplier2 : 
Rearranging the system of first-order conditions leads to 
u'(ci) 
PtU1 (ci) 
f3 Rt+l 
f3Pt+let+l(l + g'(xt+ I)) 
(3 .6) 
(3.7) 
Recalling that u~ = 1, equation (3.6) is the first Euler equation which provides that 
in an optimal plan the marginal utility cost of saving equals the marginal utility 
benefit obtained by doing that. More specifically, the opportunity cost (in terms of 
current utility) of saving one more unit in the current period in the form of financial 
assets must be equal to the benefit of having Rt+l more units in the next period. 
This benefit is the discounted additional utility that can be obtained next period 
through the increase in consumption by Rt+l units. Rearranging equation (3.6) , an 
alternative interpretation follows from : 
u'(ci) 
-
13
- = Rt+l 
the utility marginal rate of intertemporal substitution u'~\) should be equal to the 
marginal rate of transformation Rt+l which is the rate at which savings in the form of 
financial assets allow an agent to shift consumption from period t to t + 1. Equation 
(3.7) is the second Euler equation which indicates t hat the opportunity cost (in terms 
2 To determine the third first-order condition , wc first substit utcd the transition equation for 
t he resource: h t+l = xt+l + g(xt+l)- Xt+2 · 
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of current utility) of saving the value of one more unit in the current period in the 
form of resource stock must be equal to the bene fit of having (} t+ 1 ( 1 + g' ( Xt+ 1)) more 
units valued Pt+l each in the next period. This benefit is the discounted additional 
utility that can be obtained next period through the increase in consomption by 
Bt+l( l+g'(xt+l))P'+1 units. Rearranging equation (3 .7) , an alternative interpretation 
Pt 
follows from : 
u'(ci) n ( '( ))Pt+l 
-
13
- = Ut+l 1 + g Xt+ l --
Pt 
the utility marginal rate of intertemporal substitution should be equal to the mar-
ginal rate of transformation Bt+l (1 + g' (xt+I)) Pt.+l which is the rate at which savings 
Pt 
in the form of resource stock allow an agent to shift consomption from period t to 
t + 1. Equations (3.6) and (3.7) together imply the arbitrage condition for the two 
assets at the equilibrium : 
( '( ))Pt+l R t+ l = e t+l 1 + g xt+l --
Pt 
(3.8) 
which provides that the interest factor should be equal to the resource priee adjusted 
growth factor considering the quality of property rights. When savings behavior is 
optimized, we see from equation (3.8) that the priee paths of the resource stock 
adjusts itself to the quality of the property rights. In other words, the finn and 
the young pay for the stock exactly what it is worth considering the quality of the 
property rights. 
We now consider the market clearing conditions : 
c~ + c~- 1 = f(ht) (3.9) 
is the consomption good market clearing condition. 
(3.10) 
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is the renewable resource stock market clearing condition. 
St = Ü (3.11) 
The fact that the arbitrage condition (equation (3.8)) is verified, that there is only 
one type of consumer pcr generation (i.e. , no intragenerational heterogeneity) and no 
government debt, forces the asset market clearing condition to be such that saving 
is 0 for all t . 
Firm's profits are 
The first-order condit ions for the firm's profits ma.ximization, expressed per capita, 
are 
(3 .12) 
(3.13) 
They determine the demand for the factors of production Ht and Lt3 from their 
marginal costs BtPt and Wt· With a constant returns to scale technology, the firm 
has zero profits at the optimum. The resource priee is endogenous in this economy. 
However, in a partial equilibrium analysis, we note that , for a given resource priee, 
the marginal cast of the resource is lowered as (1 - Bt) is appropriated from the old 
at no cast by the firm. Equation (3.12) defines the quantity of resource harvested as 
an implicit function of the quality of property rights; for a given priee, the derivative 
of that implicit function4 is negative as J" < 0 : the more partial the property rights 
on the resource stock, the higher the quantity harvested. When Bt ____, 0, we have : 
3 Thc labor markcl also dean; and wc have : L1 = L 'rit as thcrc is no population growth. 
4
'1j;(ht, (lt) = f'(ht) - (JtPt lcading to ~ = 1J(/,t) < 0 
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ht --t Xt + g(xt) : the resource is exhausted in period t . This is an illustration of the 
traditional tragedy of the commons when preferences are quasi linear and harvest 
costs are zero. 5 
Equation (3.13), on the other hand, defines the wage as an implicit function of 
the quality of the property rights; for a given resource priee, the derivative of that 
implicit function is negativé : the more partial the property rights on the resource 
stock, the higher the wage. We define the intertemporal equilibrium in the next 
paragraph. 
3.4.2 Intertemporal equilibrium 
In this economy, the link between two periods t and t + 1 is given by the resource 
dynamics and by the rational expectations on resource priees and property rights 
quality7 . Using the transition equation for the renewable resource stock (3.10) and 
the first-order conditions for profit maximization (3 .12) and (3.13) to eliminate input 
priees from the first-order condition for the resource stock (3.7) , the intertemporal 
equilibrium is , for a given initial resource stock x1 , a sequence of temporary equilibria 
that satisfies for all t 2: 0 the following conditions : 
(3.14) 
5In sorne fishcry modcls, harvcst costs incrcasc as the rcsourcc stock diminishcs, prcvcnting 
extinction. 
6 Using equations (3.12) and (3.13) , wc have: f"(h)dh = pdB and f!(h)dh- f!(h)dh - hf" (h)dh = 
dw lcading to ~':; =-ph < O. 
7 Thcrc is no unccrtainty in this cconomy so that rational cxpectations arc equivalent to pcrfect 
foresight. 
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j'(ht+I) ,BBt[1 + g'(xt+I) ] = u'[f(ht) - j'(ht)ht- : t j'(ht) Xt+Ilf'(ht) (3.15) 
where we have also used the periodic budget constraints (3.3) and (3.4). In this 
paper, we consider steady-state equilibria . 
3.5 Competitive steady-states equilibria : existence, 
number and stability properties 
Consistent with the durable nature of the quality of property rights, the study 
focuses on the steady-states of the dynamic system defined by equations (3.14) and 
(3.15). In addition, the quality of property rights is assumed constant over t ime, 
Bt = B 'rit, in what follows. Prior to addressing whether the steady states are optimal 
in sections 3.6 and 3.7, the conditions of existence and the number of steady-states 
are defined in this section using the approach of Koskela et al. (2002) adapted to 
a context involving partial property rights. The different phases of the dynamical 
system and the local stability properties of the steady-states are also determined. 
3.5.1 Existence of steady-states 
If steady-states exist , they are solution to the following system obtained from 
(3.14) and (3.15) with D. xt = 0 and D.ht = 0 : 
h = g(x) 
u'[f(h)- f'(h)(h + ~) ] = ,88[1 + g'(.'E)] 
52 
(3 .16) 
(3.17) 
In order to ensure that this system has at least one solution, we need to modify 
Koskela et al. (2002) 's conditions of existence to take into account the possibility of 
partial property rights as follows : 
(3 .18) 
with 
x Xc(B) = argmax[f(g( x))- J'(g(x))(g(x) + e)l (3.19) 
and 
Clm(B) = f [g(xc (B))] - J' [g(xc (B))][g(xc[B]) + Xc~B) ] (3.20) 
is the maximized first-period steady-state consumption. In other words, for a steady-
state to exist , the marginal utility of the highest possible consumption in the first-
period should be lower than the discounted benefits (taking into account the quality 
of the property rights) from the growth of the resource stock which maximizes the 
first-period consumption. If it is higher, it is not worth waiting to consume. With a 
very low discount factor or very weak property rights , consumers may not want to 
consume anything in any future period and, therefore, no decentralized steady-state 
equilibrium exists. In what follows, we caU ë the minimum quality of property rights 
for which steady-states exist. 
A question arises : how restrictive is this condition of existence ? An answer 
can be given through a numerical illustration. If we assume an annual pure rate of 
time preference of 2% per year (which is consistent with Arrow (1995)) and assume 
that a period lasts 30 years in our model, we have f3 = 0. 55. With logarithmic 
preferences for the first period, with the Cobb-Douglas production function and 
the logistic growth function used in our numerical illustration (section 3.8) , we find 
ë '::::' 0.8. Moreover , as we will be mainly interested in situations where there may 
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be overaccumulation of resource at the steady-state, it is even more likely that this 
condition of existence will be verified as those require a high discount factor (i.e., a 
low rate of t ime preference) : in our numerical illustration, a discount factor higher 
t han (3 = 0.7158 (corresponding to ë ~ 0.65) leads to overaccumulation. In what 
follows, we consider situations where equation (3. 18) is verified. 
3.5.2 Number of steady-states 
In orcier to determine the number of steady states, we need to first define the 
two isoclines corresponding to the system of equations (3.14) and (3.15) and then 
compare t heir slopes to see when, and how, they intersect. The first isocline is 
obtained from (3 .14) when /;:. xt = 0 but ht can vary over time: 
ht = g (x) (3.21) 
For the second isocline, the isocline associated with the Euler equation, it is helpful 
to see that equation (3 .15) defines ht as an implicit function of Xt+ l and then, using 
(3. 14) consider that implicit function when !;:.ht = 0 and Xt can vary over time8 : 
with: 
w(h , Xt) = u' [f(h)- j'(h)h-~f'(h)(xt+g (xt )-h)]-(3B[l+g'(xt+g (xt )- h)] (3.22) 
The slope of (3.21) is : 
dht 1 = g'(x ) 
dxt 6.x ,.=O 
(3.23) 
8 Rccalling that the quali ty of propcrty rights is now constant . 
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The slope of (3.22) is <!:&1 = - 'l' x(h ,xt) leading to : 
dxt C!.ht = O 'l' h{h,xt) 
(u"L + j3Bg")( 1 + g') 
e > 0 
u"[f'- !"(~ + h)] + j3Bg" (3.24) 
While the slope in (3.23) can be positive, null, or negative, the slope in (3.24) is 
always positive in the neighbourhood of an equilibrium given the assumptions on 
the utility function and because in the steady-state equilibrium (1 + g') = ~ > O. 
It can also be shown that (h = 0, x = 0) is a point of (3.21) where (h > 0, x = 0) 
is a point of (3.22) 9 . Therefore, by a similar rationale to Koskela et al. (2002)'s 
first proposition, we find that when there are steady-state equilibria (i.e., equation 
(3.18) is verified), there are at least two of them, except for the rare case, where 
the Euler equation and the growth curve are tangent to each other. Besicles, when 
two steady-states exist, the isocline associated with the Euler equation necessarily 
cuts the growth curve first from above and then from below. On the portion of 
the growth curve where g'(x) ~ 0, there can only be one steady-state equilibrium 
because the slope of the Euler (equation (3.24)) is al ways positive. In what follows, 
we concentrate on the case of two steady-states; i.e., the isocline associated with 
the Euler equation cuts the growth curve from above in the case of the equilibrium 
with the smaller level of resource stock : 
9When the quality of property rights is explicitly considered, Koskcla et al. (2002) 's proof must 
be amended as follows : when x ---> 0, the second terrn on the Right Hand Side (RHS) of equation 
(3 .22) approaches sorne finite nurnber when () E [ë, 1]. For \[1 = 0 to hold , the first term of the 
RHS of equation (3.22) must also approach sorne finite nurnber. Koskcla et al. (2002) show that it 
happens for sorne strictly positive finite value of h. 
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The isocline associated with the Euler equation cuts the growth curve from below 
in the equilibrium with the larger level of resource stock : 
dht 1 dht 1 
dxt Llh,=O > dxt fl xt.= D 
We call xf and xf those decentralized steady-state equilibria with xf < xf . 
3.5.3 Stability properties of the steady-states 
To study the stability properties of the steady-states, the different phases of the 
dynamical system are defined (phase-diagrams for specifie sets of parameters are 
drawn in section 3.8 - Figure 3.1) , th en the local stability properties are determined. 
Phases of the dynamical system 
The paths, for which .Tt+ l 2': Xt and ht+l > ht , are now considered. It follows 
from (3. 14) that : 
Therefore, in the {x, h} space, x increases inside the area delimited by g(xt) and 
x decreases outside that area. It follows from (3 .15) and our assumptions on the 
production function that : 
This defines the area above the 6ht = 0 isocline, which is made clear in the next 
paragraph. Therefore, h increases above the 6ht = 0 isocline and decreases below. 
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Local stability properties 
Equations (3.14) and (3.15) can be rewritten as : 
f ' (h ) = [u'[f(ht)- f'(ht)ht- tf'(ht) Xt+l]] f'(h) (3.26) 
t+l ,88[1 + g'(xt+ I)] t 
Substituting (3.25) into (3.26) leads to : 
:=:(xt, ht) = J'(ht+I) _ [u' [f(ht)- f'(ht)ht- ~f'(ht)[xt- ht + g (xt)Jl]f'(ht) = 0 
,88[1 + g'(xt- ht + g (xt))] 
(3.27) 
which defines a two arguments implicit function for ht+l : 
(3.28) 
T he planar system describing the dynamics of the resource stock and harvesting 
now consists of (3.25) and (3.28). The stability of the steady-states depends on the 
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the partial derivatives of the system : 
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian are studied in Appendix C and a proof of the 
following proposition, which is an extension from Koskela et al. (2002) 's proposition 
2 to an economy where property rights can be partial, is provided. 
Proposition 3.1 When the quality of property rights is explicitly considered, in the 
case of concave resource growth with two steady-states, the steady-state equilibrium 
associated with a larger natural stock is saddle stable while the steady-state equili-
brium associated with a smaller stock is unstable. To the extent that the steady-states 
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exist, the stability properties of the steady-states do not depend on the quality of pro-
perty rights. 
3.6 Efficient steady-state equilibria 
De la Croix and Michel (2002) point out that the conditions for long run inter-
generational efficiency depend on whether only the younger generation is considered 
in the steady-state or both the initial older generation and the younger generation 
are considered. We follow Diamond (1965) 's seminal article which defines "golden 
age" paths by excluding the initial older generation10 . The social planner's problem 
is therefore to maximize the lifetime welfare of a representative individual subject 
to the constraint that the aggregate consumption is equal to production : 
max W = u(cl) + /3c2 
(c1 ,c2 ,x) 
subject to: 
h = g(x) 
c1 + c2 = f(h) 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
As pointed out by Diamond (1965) in an economy where capital and labor were used 
as production inputs , such a maximization problem decomposes naturally into two 
separate problems : that of optimizing the height of the consumption constraint; and 
10In other words, it is assumed that the social planner gives the same weight to each generat ion, 
i.e . there is no social discount ing. While this assumption is frequent in resource economies, a fruitful 
extension could consider the impact of social disco un ting on the findings of this paper. Based on our 
preliminary research, wc cxpect those findings to hold for reasonablc values of the social discount 
factors . 
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that of dividing this amount of consumption between the different periods of life. 
Here, resource and labor are used as production inputs, optimizing the height of the 
consumption constraints (equation (3.30)) means selecting the optimal per capita 
level of harvest. Note that the optimality of per capita harvest is independent of the 
exact division of consumption. Equations (3.30) and (3.29) define the maximum per 
capita harvest as the solution of : 
g' (x*) = 0 
h* = g(x* ) 
(3.31) 
(3.32) 
with x* the optimal stock and h* the optimal harvest levels at the steady-state. We 
note that equation (3.31) defines the maximum sustainable yield which is the Golden 
Rule level of resource stock and that equation (3.32) defines the Golden Rule level 
of harvest. 
The second problem is to define the optimal intertemporal lifetime allocation of 
the maximized amount of total consumption obtained with h* and x* . The solution 
of the social planner's problem subject to the constraints (3.30) , (3.31) and (3 .32) 
lS : 
(3.33) 
In the next section, we compare t he efficiency conditions with the conditions defining 
our decentralized steady-state equilibria. 
3. 7 Optimal property rights 
In our economy, the quality of property rights is represented by a single para-
meter. It is generally not possible to hit two birds with one stone. The problem 
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of maximizing total consumption and the one of optimizing the allocation of that 
maximized consumption between the two lifetime periods are separate. In what fol-
lows, we focus on the first problem : we investigate whether a quality of property 
rights can be found to maximize total consumption. We discuss the second problem 
at the end of the section. 
Let xf ( B), i = 1, 2, represent the decentralized steady-state equilibria associated 
with property right quality e, e E [ë, 1]. At xf(B), i = 1, 2, h = g[xf (B)] ~ 0, 
(3.29) and (3 .30) are verified as they are constraints considered in the decentralized 
optimization problem. Efficient resource stock and harvest must verify equations 
(3.31) and (3 .32) . First, consider the situations where property rights are complete, 
e = 1, and focus on the steady-state with the larger stock. Koskela et al. (2002) 
have shown that x? ( 1) may or may not be optimal depending on the value of the 
parameters on technology, preferences and resource dynamics. A Pareto optimal 
competitive equilibria with complete property rights is such that : 
(3.34) 
The set of parameters implying a non efficient steady-state equilibrium in presence 
of complete rights is defined by : 
(3.35) 
That is 
(3.36) 
We must prove that, in situations where equation (3.35) holds, B* E [ë, 1] exists such 
that, at the steady-state, resource stock and harvest are at their first-best levels. 
The first-best level of stock is defined by equation (3.31). B* E [ë, 1] must verify : 
(3.37) 
For a given quality of property rights , xD(B) is the solution of equation (3.17) : 
x 
u'[f(h)- j'(h)(h + e)l = ,68[1 + g'(x)] 
which defines x as an implicit function of 8 : 
Sl(x , B) = u'[f(h) - J'(h)(h + ~ )] - ,68( 1 + g'(x)) = 0 (3.38) 
From the implicit function theorem, we know that : 
dx 
dB 
From equation (3 .18), we know that a steady-state equilibirum exists only if g'(x) > 
-1 VB E [ë, 1] as the marginal utility of consumption is positive. Wh en -1 < g' < 0, 
we have 
an(x, B) x 1.,( ) "( ) 4 ( '( )) 88 = (8)2 h u c1 - }J 1 + 9 x < o 
and, recalling that h = g (x) at the steady state, 
an~:' B) = [-g'( x)f"(h)h- g'(x){'(h) x- f'~•)]u"(ci)- ,68g"(x) > 0 
Therefore, 
(3.39) 
The more partial the property rights, the lower the resource stock. From equations 
(3.36) and (3.39) , we find B* < 1. Let's prove that 8* 2: ë. When 8 = ë, we have 
x -
u'[f(h)- j'(h)(h + e)l - ,68(1 + g'(x)) = 0 (3.40) 
From equation (3.18) , we know that Xc (ë) is solution of equation (3.40). Xc (ë) is the 
level of stock that maximizes the consumption in the first period. Wc know that 
any harvest corresponding to a level of stock beyond the maximum sustainable yield 
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can also be reached with a level of stock below the maximum sustainable yield. 
Moreover, for any given level of harvest, a higher consumption will be achieved with 
a lower stock11 . Therefore, in order to maximize consumption in the first period, 
Xc(ë) must be such that xc(ë) :S: x* . Renee, B* 2: 7J meaning that the condition of 
existence of a steady state remains verified. 
Using equations (3.17), (3 .31) and (3.32), B* is the solution of12 
u' [f(h*)- j'(h*)(h* + ~: )] = {38* (3.41) 
Proposition 3.2 When complete property rights are inefficient in a perfectly com-
petitive OLG economy, there always exists a quality of property rights that leads to 
first-best steady-state levels of resource stock and harvest. 
From equation (3.41) , it is also clear that the optimal quality of property rights 
depends on preferences , on technology and on resource stock. Finally, one can verify 
that B* does not solve the problem of the optimal intertemporal allocation of the 
maximized consumption (equation (3.33)). However, property rights on both labor 
and the production output are assumed complete in this paper. In the next chapter, 
we show that an efficient quality of property rights , not necessarily complete, on 
labor income can optimally reallocate the maximized consumption between the two 
lifetime periods. 
ll!is.J =-f.'_<O dx h co nst.a n t. 8 · 
12We have u'[f(h*) - f'(h*)( h* + 1."':. )] = ,8( 1 - w*) where w* = 1 - (}* i ~ an alternative 
expre~~ion for the indicator of the quali ty of property right~, which h~ an interpretation con~istent 
with the indicator for the quality of property right~ in the previou~ chapter. In fact , w* = 1 
corre~ponds to the absence of property rights and w* = 0 corre~pond~ to complete property rights. 
62 
---------
3.8 Numerical illustrations 
To shed further light on the properties of the model and contrast the results with 
those with complete rights, the same parametric example as in Koskela et al. (2002) 
is used. The first-period utility function, the production function, and the resource 
growth function are assumed to be : 
f(h) 
g(x) 
ln c1 
ha with 0 < a < 1 
1 2 
ax- -bx 
2 
(3.42) 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
The economically interesting parameters are the output elasticity of the resource a 
which determines the priee elasticity of resource demand, and the discount factor f3 . 
Equation (3.44) is the logistic growth function for renewable resources. With these 
specifications, equations (3.16) and (3 .17) reduce to : 
1 h = ax - -bx2 
2 
1 
...,-----:-:------.,....- = f3 () ( 1 + a - bx ) (1- a)ha - aha- l~ 
Koskela et al. (2002) 's situation where a steady state equilibrium can be inefficient 
under complete rights (when () = 1) is replicated by choosing a = 1, b = 0.001 which 
imply the Golden Rule level of stock and harvest i: = 1000 (Îi = 500) and x= 2000 
and by choosing a= 0.15 . Four scenarios summarized in table 3.1 are considered. 
Golden rule stock and harvest levels depend on the resource growth parameters and 
are the same for all scenarios. A perfectly competitive economy is considered in all 
scenarios, with the exception of partial property rights assumed in scenarios 3 and 4. 
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Scenario 1 considers a situation where the OLG economy has a decentralized Pareto 
optimal steady-state at t he larger stock; resource stock and harvest are at their 
Golden Rule levels; intertemporal utility is optimized. In scenario 2, the discount 
factor is f3 = 0.90, property rights remain complete: the OLG economy now exhibits 
dynamic inefficiency : at the decentralized steady-state, the stock level is above its 
Golden Rule level, harvest is below its Golden Rule level. As x? > .i, the optimality 
condition g' (xf) 2: 0 is not verified : xf is inefficient with complete rights. It is also 
saddle stable as it is the steady-state with the larger stock. Scenario 3 differs from 
scenario 2 : property rights are no longer complete. The optimal quality of property 
rights is computed, using equation (3.41), we find e· = 0.8675. The decentralized 
steady-state at the larger stock with e• = 0.8675 leads to first-best resource stock 
and harvest levels are at their Golden Rule levels. In other words, in order to reach 
the first-best levels of resource stock and harvest, the firm must harvest 13.25% of the 
old agent stock without paying for it. If the entire stock was protected, the steady-
state equilibrium with the larger stock would not lead to first-best resource stock 
and harvest as was shown in scenario 2. In scenario 4, we consider property rights 
weaker than the optimal quality, e = 0.8, the OLG economy exhibits inefficiency 
due to too weak property rights : at the decentralized steady-state, both resource 
stock and harvest are below their golden rule levels. The resource is overextracted. 
The graph on the left-hand side of Figure 3.1 shows that the steady-state with 
the larger stock of resource is saddle stable and inefficient as it is located to the 
right of the maximum sustainable yield (x 0 (1) = 1131.09 > i; = 1000 and hf(l) = 
491.408 < Î1 = 500). The graph on the right-hand side of Figure 3.1 shows the 
steady-state with optimal incomplete property rights (x(B*) = x, h(B*) = h) and 
that it is saddle stable. 
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Golden rule stock level 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Golden rule harvest level 500 500 500 500 
Discount factor 0.71 58 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Property rights quality 1 1 0.8675 0.8 
Resource stock 1000 1131.09 1000 914.386 
Harvest level 500 491.408 500 496.374 
Production 2.54007 2.53347 2.54007 2.5373 
Resource priee 0.000762 0.000773 0.000878 0.000958 
Wage 2.15906 2.15345 2.15906 2.1567 
Consumption first-period 1.39704 1.27875 1.28072 1.27989 
Consumption second-period 1.14303 1.25473 1.25935 1.25741 
Utility first-period 0.334354 0.245879 0.247421 0.246774 
Utility second-period 1.14303 1.25473 1.25935 1.25741 
Intertemporal utility 1.15254 1.37513 1.38084 1.37844 
Tab. 3.1: Numcrical Illustrat ions 
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Resource Stock Resource S10ck 
Fig . 3 .1: Phase diagrams of the dynamical system with complete and part ial property rights 
rcspcct ivcly. 
3.9 Conclusion 
Complete property rights can lead to resource overaccumulation at the steady-
state. When property rights are complete, households appropriate themselves a share 
of the resource stock that should optimally be used in production. In other words, 
the paradigm according to which inefficiencies are a consequence of weak institut ions 
that allow such ill behavior as theft is partly reversed. Inefficiencies can also be a 
consequence of too strong property rights. Efficient instit utions may involve partial 
property rights. In this paper , we have shown that there always exists a quality of 
property rights, though not necessarily complete, leading to steady-state optimal 
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resource extraction and resource stock. Optimal partial property rights increase 
the lifetime welfare of all individuals. We have also shown that steady-sta tes with 
optimal partial property rights are saddle stable. 
Overfishing, deforestation, endangered species often result from institutions that 
are too weak. Although property rights may need to be strengthened in those situa-
tions, we show that they do not need to be complete to achieve efficiency. Strong, 
efficient institutions often need to fall short of imposing complete property rights. 
Beyond a certain quality of property rights , strengthening them further is inefficient. 
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Chapitre 4 
OVERLAPPING 
GENERATIONS, PHYSICAL 
CAPITAL AND THE OPTIMAL 
QUALITY OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered an economy involving a renewable resource stock 
and we showed that partial property rights on a resource stock could lead to first-
best steady-state resource harvest and stock. Conventional capital differs from a 
renewable resource. First, the services from the whole capital stock, not an extrac-
ted share of the stock, constitute the relevant production input. Important to this 
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distinction is the macroeconomies tradition to normalize the rate of utilization of 
the capital factor to equal one, so that the flow dimension of the capital used in 
production corresponds to the stock dimension of the capital accumulated through 
savings. Second, capital depreciation is always a negative contribution to capital 
growth while resource growth is usually positive at relevant stock levels. Those dit:.. 
ferences matter for the optimal quality of property rights. In fact, if we were to adopt 
a rationale similar to the one of the previous chapter and to assume part ial property 
rights on the stock of capital, they would lower its cost as an input in production, 
increase its demand and lead to further capital accumulation. Therefore , contrary 
to a resource stock, partial property rights on a capital stock do not prevent capital 
overaccumulation; they worsen the situation. In a perfectly competitive economy 
where agents live finite lives, property rights on capital stock must be complete . 
This observation justifies a separate study for the optimal quality of property rights 
when regular capital rather than a renewable natural resource is used as production 
input. This chapter therefore investigates the merits for an overlapping generations 
economy, using physical capital and labor as inputs in production, to have partial 
property rights. The quality of property rights on the young's income is defined as 
the proportion of her labour income that the young can retain. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the steady-state equilibrium of a perfectly 
competitive OLG economy need not be Pareto efficient. The first theorem of welfare 
may fail to apply because there is an infinite number of fini tel y lived agents. However, 
not every equilibrium is inefficient. Efficiency is linked to the marginal productivity 
of capital ; the Cass criterion (Cass, 1972) gives necessary and sufficient conditions 
for efficiency : the marginal productivity of capital must be high enough to compen-
sate for the growth of the other productive factors in the economy. The possibility 
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of inefficiency arises from the fact that the competitive growth equilibrium of an 
OLG economy may involve excessive savings. This paper formally investigates these 
Pareto inefficiencies in terms of the quality of property rights in an overlapping ge-
nerations model with both capital and labor as inputs in production. We show that 
there always exists a quality of property rights on the young's income that leads to 
the first-best optimal steady-state. Under standard assumptions on preferences and 
technology, we establish the optimal steady-state quality of property rights. Partial 
property rights on income may wrongly be construed as a different name for an 
income tax on the young's income since both have the effect of transferring income 
from the young to the old. We therefore discuss in length how similarities in effects 
hide differences in nature and origins. 
Few papers have studied the impact of partial property rights on equilibrium 
in OLG models. Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2013) question the economie rationale 
of pronatalist policies. They consider an OLG model where capital and labor are 
inputs in production, with fertility choice and parental altruism. When the cost 
of bearing children is positive, they show that parents' appropriation of children's 
income is rendered necessary to have a non-zero equilibrium fertility. In this paper, 
the fertility is exogenous, there is no cost of bearing of children and, consistent with 
the Walrasian tradition, no altruism is assumed. 
This paper investigates the optimality of partial property rights. Partial property 
rights can be the results of legal rights attributed to the old on a share of the young's 
incarne and/or the results of weakly enforced and/or defined property rights on the 
young's income. We consider effective or de facto property rights and not legal rights; 
the two coïncide only when legal rights are perfectly defined and enforced. This paper 
also discusses how partial property rights on incarne differ from an income tax. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the basic structure of 
the model. Section 4.3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium. In section 4.4, 
we characterize the decentralized steady-state equilibrium. Section 4.5 provides a 
characterization of the efficient steady-state. Section 4.6 studies the existence of an 
optimal quality of property rights and determines its expression as a function of 
technology and preferences. Section 4. 7 discusses how partial property rights differ 
from an income tax. We conclude in the last section. 
4. 2 The mo del 
We consider an overlapping generations economy where agents live for two per-
iods : a working period and a retirement period. We assume that agents maximize 
the intertemporally additive lifetime utility function : 
( 4.1) 
where c~ denotes the period i = 1, 2 consumption of a consumer-worker born at 
time t and f3 = 1~P with p being the exogenous rate of time preference. u( c) is the 
period utility function. It is assumed to be the same in both periods of life. It is 
assumed continuous and twice continuously differentiable with u' > 0, u" < 0, and 
limc->oo u' ( c) = 0 and lime_, au' ( c) = oo. The population grows at a constant rate n : 
Lt+l = (1 + n)Lt (4.2) 
The young are endowed with one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically to 
the firm. The labor earns a competitive wage. The representative consumer-worker 
uses the wage to buy the consumption good and save in the form of capital goods, 
which constitute the non-consumed part of aggregate output. 
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There is a representative firm which produces a good used for both consumption 
and investment. The firm has access to a constant returns to scale technology that 
produces output yt using two production factors : capital K and labor L. It is repre-
sented by a linearly homogeneous production function : F(Kt,Lt)· This technology 
can be expressed in factor-intensive form to give f(kt) = F(J~:;L,) with the standard 
properties f~,. > 0 and f~t < O. Furthermore, we assume that the Inada conditions 
are verified : limk_,o f'(kt) = oo and lim~,; _,00 f' (kt) = 0, where kt = 1; is the per-
capita level of stock (also referred to as capital intensity or capital-labor ratio). The 
assumption of a representative finn is not restrictive because with constant returns 
to scale, the number of firms does not matter and production is independent on 
the number of firms which use the same technology. Moreover, since the firm has 
constant returns to scale technology, profits are zero in equilibrium and we do not 
have to specify ownership of the firm. The firm rents labor input and capital input 
from the representative household. Also, as noted by De la Croix and Michel (2002), 
we may assume that firms live forever. This would not change the results as the 
firm's problem in any case is a static one. 
cp E [0 , 1] is an indicator of the quality of property rights on the young's income. 
We assume that the old appropriate a share cp of her contemporaneous young's in-
come at no cost . cp= 0 represents complete property rights on young's income and 
cp = 1 represents the absence of property rights. Partial property rights are not limi-
ted to legal rights attributed to the old on a share of the young's income1 , they can 
also be the results of weakly enforced and/ or defined property rights on the young's 
1 Examplcs can be fou nd in Schoonbordt and Tcrtilt (2010) : they includc, but arc not limi tcd to , 
mandatory parental support or fil ial rcsponsibility laws that affect parents' acccss to an offspring's 
labor incomc. 
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income. Effective or de facto property rights and legal rights coïncide only when 
legal rights are perfectly defined and enforced. We note that indirect appropriation 
of the young's income could alternatively have been considered. It would require a 
slightly different settings : the representative young would be assumed to inelasti-
cally supply N labour hours , sorne of those working hours would be unpaid which 
would lead to a higher share of the firm 's revenues paid to the old. To the extent 
that the rate of return on savings has second order impacts on savings decisions 
as would, for instance, be the case if preferences were, as is commonly assumed in 
OLG models, logarithmic, the resulting lower young's income would have the same 
effect on capital accumulation as the situation, considered in this paper, of direct 
appropriation of a share of the young's income by the old. 
The capital in this model has two roles : it is a savings vehicle and an input in 
the production of a consumption good. The young's savings are denoted by St . The 
periodic budget constraints are thus : 
ci + St = (1 - cp )wt 
c~ = Rt+ lst + (1 + n)cpwt+l 
(4.3) 
( 4.4) 
where Wt is the wage rate and R t+l is the return factor on savings from time t to 
time t+ 1. When old in period t + 1, the young of period t appropriates (1 +n)cpwt+l 
as there are (1 + n) young in period t + 1. From equation (4.4), we have: 
c~ (1 + n)cpwt+l St = -- - -'----'---
Rt+l R t+l 
(4.5) 
T he intertemporal budget constraint is : 
t c~- (1 + n)cpwt+l (1 ) cl+ R = -cp Wt 
t+l 
( 4.6) 
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4.3 Competitive equilibrium 
To study the competitive equilibrium, we follow De la Croix and Michel (2002) 's 
approach and distinguish the temporary equilibrium and the intertemporal equili-
brium. 
4.3.1 Temporary equilibrium 
The temporary cquilibrium of period t is a competitive equilibrium given priee 
expectations. It is such that : (i) the representative agent optimizes her lifetim 
utility subject to both her budget constraint in each period and her priee expecta-
t ions, and, (ii) all markets clear at period t. The temporary equilibrium gives the 
equilibrium value of the current variables, including current priees as a function of 
the past and of the expectations about the future. 
Consumptions at each period ci and c~ by an individual of g neration t are 
determined as a solution to the following utility's maximization problem : 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint ( 4.6). lt gives the following first-order 
conditions for ci and c~ at the interior solution with À a non-negative multiplier : 
u'(ci) = À 
' ( t) À f3u c2 = ~ 
1 '1;+1 
which implies 
(4.7) 
Equation ( 4. 7) is the Euler equation which provides that in an optimal plan the 
marginal utility cost of saving equals the marginal utility benefit obtained by doing 
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that. More specifically, the opportunity cost (in terms of current utility) of saving 
one more unit in the current period must be equal to the benefit of having Rt+ l 
more units in the next period. This benefit is the discounted additional utility that 
can be obtained next period through the increase in consumption by Rt+ 1 units. An 
alternative interpretation follows from : 
u'(ci) (3u'(c~) = Rt+l 
That is, the utility marginal rate of intertemporal substitution fJu' ~(c\,l) should be 
1L c2 
equal to the marginal rate of transformation Rt+l which is the rate at which savings 
allow an agent to shift consumption from period t to t + 1. There are infinitely 
many pairs ( c\, c~) satisfying equation ( 4. 7). Only wh en requiring that the two period 
budget constraints be satisfied, do we get unique solution for ci and c~ or equivalently 
for St for any given quality of property rights. With the budget constraint inserted 
in equation ( 4. 7), it determines the saving of the young as an implicit funct ion of 
Wt, Rt+l but also Wt+l and <p, i.e., 
( 4.8) 
which defines the savings function2 . The partial derivatives of this function can 
be found by using the implicit function theorem on equation (4.7) , which can be 
rewritten : 
2 For instance, it can easily be verified that if the functional form of the period utili ty is assumed 
CRRA, equation (4.8) becomes: 
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The implicit function theorem leads to3 : 
ÔSt O 
- > ÔWt 
Th . f ÔSt .. d . e s1gn o -8R IS m etermmate. t+l 
ÔSt O 
-- < 
ÔWt+l 
ÔSt O 
- < Ô cp 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
The interpretation of equations ( 4.10) and ( 4.11) is standard (De la Croix and 
Michel, 2002) : in particular, it is known that with logarithmic preferences 8~81 = 0 t.+l 
and with CRRA preferences 8~·~:~ > 0 when the elasticity of marginal utility is 
lower than 1 : savings increases with an increase in the interest rate because the 
substitution effect (i.e. , higher interest rate makes future consumption cheaper in 
tenns of current consumption) dominates the incarne effects (i.e ., a given budget 
can bu y more consumption goods in both periods). We focus on the interpretation 
of equations (4.12) and (4.13). Equation (4. 12) means that the anticipation of a 
greater appropriation in period t+ 1, for any given partial property rights, due to a 
greater wage income for the young of period t+ 1 leads to lower savings in period t . 
Equation (4.13) means that bath a lower secure wage incarne in period t and the 
anticipation of a greater appropriation in period t+ 1, for any given young of period 
t+ 1 's in come, due to more partial property rights leads to lower savings in period 
an(.) 
3 AJ)plying the implicit function thcorcm to equation (4 .9) givcs : ~ = - a,.,, · ~ = 
· awt an( . ) , 8 Rt + I 
a.<;, 
..Q!!.U_ an(.) ~ 
_ an,+, · ~= - 0 "''+ ' ·~ = -..,2:L_. Wc have a~(.)= - u" (ct) - f3 (R )2u" (ct) > 0 and ~ 'élwt+ l an(.) ' acp !!;lU as, 1 t+l 2 
a.,t {i";i'f a .• , 
a_n( .) = (1-tn )u"(c1· ) < 0 .an (.) = -f3u' (ct) -f3(R )2u"(ct ) .an( .) = -(3R (1 +n ),nu" (c1· ) > 0 fJw,, r 1 ' fJ R t+l 2 t+l 2 ' fJWt + l t+1 r 2 ' 
a~~- ) = -Wttt" (ci)- f3 Rt+1(1 + n)wt+ l u" (c~) > 0. 
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t. We now consider the market clearing conditions. 
(4.14) 
is t he consumption good market clearing condition. 
(4.15) 
is the capital market 's clearing condition with 6 the rate of capital depreciation. In 
what follows, we assume for simplicity, as is common in OLG models, full deprecia-
tion in each period (6 = 1). Equation (4.15) has a straightforward interpretation, 
t he supply of funds by the representative young equals investment by the represen-
tative finn. It can be expressed in intensive terms using the expression of the savings 
function. Substituting ( 4.8) into ( 4.15) gives : 
dividing both sides by Lt+l gives : 
(4. 16) 
Equation (4. 16) states that savings of the young is transformed into productive 
capital for the next period. 
The profit function is: F(Kt,Lt)- RtKt -wtLt. The firm maximizes profits under 
perfect competition. The first-order conditions are : 
fk(kt) = Rt 
f(kt) - ktfk(kt) = Wt 
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(4.17) 
(4.18) 
Equations (4. 17) and (4. 18) determine the demand for the factors of production K t 
and Lt as a function of their marginal costs Rt and Wt 4 . Clearing of the factor markets 
determines the equilibrium factor priees : Rt(kt) and Wt(kt) and the levels of factor 
inputs consistent with the equilibrium. We define the intertemporal equilibrium in 
the next paragraph. 
4.3.2 Intertemporal Equilibrium 
In this economy, the link between two periods t and t + 1 is given by the ac-
cumulation rule for capital (equation ( 4.16) ) and by the formation of expectations. 
Using the first-order conditions for profit maximization ( 4. 17) and ( 4.18) to elimi-
nate input priees from equation (4. 16) , the intertemporal equilibrium is, for a given 
initial capital stock k1 , a sequence of temporary equilibria that satisfies for all t 2: 0 
the following conditions5 : 
(4.19) 
When property rights are complete, when the utility function is CRRA (with 
4Whcn the tcchnology is Cobb-Douglas, wc have : 
(1 - a)kf = Wt 
5 For CRRA utili ty and Cobb-Douglas tcchnology, wc have 
1 cp(1 + n)(1 - a)k7+ 1 
1 + ,Ba(akf;/)a-1 akf.t/ 
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() is positive), when the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the intertemporal 
equilibrium is unique (De la Croix and Michel, 2002). In this paper , we focus on 
situation where property rights can be partial and consider steady-state equilibria. 
4.4 Decentralized steady-states 
The steady-states must be solutions ott' : 
k* = s(j(k*) - k* ]k(k*) , f k(k*), f(k*)- k* fk(k*), <p) 
l+ n 
(4.20) 
We explicitly determine the steady-state for a Cobb-Douglas technology and 
logarithmic preferences in Appendix D. Existence of the steady-states is ensured 
with CRRA preferences and a Cobb-Douglas technology. Discussion on the existence 
of steady states can be found in De La Croix and Michel (2002). Here, we assume 
that a non trivial steady-state exists. Its stability properties will be given by the 
value of 1 d~~: 1 (k*) 1 which can be calculated using the implicit function theorem on 
6 The ~teady-~tatc~ arc such that kt = k* Vt. T hcrcforc, with a CRRA ut ili ty and Cobb-Dougla~ 
technology, it must be ~olution of : 
fla( h*<>- l )a- 1 (1 + n)k* = a~ (1 - )( 1 - a)k*"' [1 +,Ba(ak•a-l)a- l j(1 +n) ~ 
1 ~( 1 + n)(1 -a) k* 
[1+ ,Ba(ak•<>- l)a - l j(1 +n) a 
Therc i ~ a trivial steady-~tatc kT- = 0 which i ~ not a viable economie equilibrium, finding the 
othcr ~tcady-statcs in presence of possibly incomplctc p ropcrty rights, 1 2: () > 0, rcquirc~ to solve 
a polynomial in k* , k*(<>- l )a+<> and k*(cr-J )a which can be donc numcrically. In Appcndix D , wc 
considcr a more tractable problcm by as~uming logarithmic preferences (i .c. , 0' = 1). 
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equation (4.19). In particular, when 
0 < ldkt+l(k*)l < 1 
dkt 
( 4.21) 
the dynamic path converges monotonically toward the locally stable steady-state 
k*. We show in Appendix D that this condition is verified with a Cobb-Douglas 
technology and logarithmic preferences. 
4.5 Efficient steady-state 
The social planner's problem is to maximize the lifetime welfare of each genera-
tion subject to the constraint that the sum of aggregate consumption and saving is 
equal to production : 
subject to: 
max W = u(c1) + f3u(c2) (c1 ,cz) 
s = (1 + n)k 
c1 + c2 + s = f ( k) 
(4.22) 
( 4.23) 
As pointed out by Diamond (1965) this maximization problem decomposes naturally 
into two separate problems, that of selecting the optimal capital-labor ratio and thus 
the height of the consumption constraint (equation ( 4.23)) ; and that of dividing this 
amount of consumption between the different periods of life. Note that the optimality 
of the capital-labor ratio is independent of the exact division of consumption. In this 
paper, we focus on the first problem. The optimal capital-labor ratio (which is also 
the Golden Rule capital-la bor ratio) is given by : 
( 4.24) 
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With a Cobb-Douglas technology, equation ( 4.24) becomes : 
[ 
a ] ~~ " kGR _ 
- (1 + n) 
4. 6 Optimal quality of property rights 
We call k* (cp) the capital-labor ratio corresponding to the quali ty of property 
rights cp . For logarithmic preferences and a Cobb-Douglas technology, we show in 
A pp en dix D th at the expression of k* (cp) is : 
1 
k* _ [ a,8(1 - cp)(1- a) ] -r=-;; 
(cp) - (1 + n) [(1 + ,B)a + cp(1- a)] 
In presence of complete rights, overaccumulation occurs when (l :a) > (l ;f3) leading 
to: 
k*(O) > kGR 
We note t hat dynamic inefficiencies in presence of complete rights could arise for 
plausible values of the parameters. In fact , using Arrow (1995) 's parametrization for 
time preference, we find ,B = 0.55 and 1;(3 = 2.81. In the empirical literature, the 
value of a is generally considered close to 0.3 . Then, if a = 0.26, the condition for 
dynamic inefficiency is verified as 1 ~0 = 2.84 > 1;(3 = 2.81. 
If a quality of property rights cp* E [0, 1] can lead to the optimal capital-labor 
ratio, it must be such that 
k*( cp* ) = kGR (4.25) 
Proposition 4.1 When an economy is dynamically inefficient, optimal partial pro-
perty rights on the young 's income lead to the first-best optimal steady-state leveZ of 
capital accumulation. Complete property rights are ineffici ent. 
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Proof. We know that k*(O) > k0 R. For 1.p E (0, 1) , as shown in equation (D.6) of 
Appendix D, we have : 
dk* 
- < 0 d~.p 
Finally, we have k*(1) = 0 < k0 R. Therefore, <p* E (0 , 1). • 
We calculate the optimal quality of property rights when the technology is Cobb-
Douglas and the preferences are logarithmic in Appendix E and find 
1-n 1+ .6 
* ----;_;--(J 
If = (1 + ,6) (1 - a) .6~ 
where ,6 is the utility discount factor and a is the elasticity of input productivity. 
4. 7 Partial property rights versus income tax 
Optimal part ial propcrty rights in this paper result in a transfer of income from 
the young to the old. It is known that intergenerational transfers can solve dyna-
mic inefficiencies : the optimal transfer can be achieved through public debt and its 
funding (Diamond, 1965), social security contributions (Samuelson, 1975) or taxes 
(Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980). We refer to those three solutions as income tax solu-
tions. How do partial property rights differ from income tax? The difference between 
tax and property rights have been extensively discussed in the Coase (1960) versus 
Pigou (1932) debate over t he last fifty years. Do any of the arguments developed 
in Coase versus Pigou debate apply to the economy considered in this paper ? The 
first point to note is that dynamic inefficiencies arise in perfectly competitive eco-
nomies without externality. Pigou and Coase approaches were aimed at correcting 
non-pecuniary externalities. A large part of the Coase versus Pigou debate is on 
how these respective approaches differ in doing so and which is the most efficient 
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under what circumstances. A key difference between the two approaches is the role 
of government. Renee, Demsetz (1996) writes 
"Coase was guided toward privatization of the interaction between par-
ties by his refusal to accept Pigou's [ ... ] idealized State as a solver of the 
externality question." 
Indeed, an implicit assumption made by Pigou is "an omniscient and omni-
present" government. Demsetz (1996) further writes 
"the tax policy of an all-knowing, well-motivated State results in cor-
rective adjustments for externalities that accord with the economists 
prescriptions. The problem is analyzed as if the State is a perfect agent 
through which the blackboard plans of economists can be brought to 
fruition. Tax solutions ignores State's associated costs of errors, imple-
mentation and improper motivation." 
Demsetz continues 
"if [Pigou] would have ruled out State action on grounds of impracti-
cality or politics, or if he would have recognized that the common law 
offered potential corrective action even if the State did not act, he would 
more likely have been led, as Coase was, to consider the consequences of 
[ assigning property rights ]. " 
In other words, corrective taxes, social contributions, the funding of public debt 
are policy instruments : they must be designed, implemented, collected and managed 
by a government. Their efficiency relies on the existence of an efficient , knowledgeable 
government. They are what Weil (2008) refers to as "centralized remedies 11 when an 
economy is dynamically inefficient. The quality of property rights is not a handily 
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available policy instrument. It is an institution and, as such, a more secular cha-
racteristic of an economy. It is not per se the solution of a problem but it happens 
that partial property rights can optimally offset the incentives in an economy to 
overaccumulate capital. The quality of property rights depends in part on laws and 
regulations but also on public investments over the long term : public investments 
in the judiciary system, police enforcement, etc. The quality of property rights also 
depends on social norms and culture. Moreover, efficient partial property rights do 
not require an efficient, knowledgeable government. They can be the results of his-
tory and social interactions. They can be the outcome from negotiated compromises 
between a multitude of economie and political forces pulling in different directions. 
When property rights are optimally partial, the adjustments towards optimality 
are decentralized. Competitive interactions of the "invisible hand" variety lead the 
economy towards the first-best steady-state equilibrium. 
Another key difference between taxes, social contributions, funding of public debt 
and partial property rights lies on redistribution. Tax redistribution is another policy 
instrument for a government . The government collects, manages and redistributes 
tax proceeds. Not only does government 's efficiency matter for implementing and 
collecting corrective taxes, it also matters for managing and efficiently redistributing 
the t axes collected. Again, taxes are a centralized instrument, the effects of partial 
property rights are the results of decentralized decisions. In fact, redistribution is 
inherent to the nature of partial property rights : appropriation is a redistribution. 
Efficient redistribution through partial property rights does not require an efficient 
government. 
One may also consider that taxes generally affect values whereas partial property 
rights affect quantities. We argue that incarne tax and partial property rights do not 
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differ in this dimension. Partial property rights result in a transfer of benefits : those 
benefits can be derived from value or from quantity. Partial property rights can affect 
either values or quantities : in this paper, partial property rights are considered on 
the young's income. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This paper shows that partial property rights on young's income can achieve 
an optimal transfer from the young to the old when an economy is dynamically 
inefficient. In circumstances different from those considered in the previous chapter 
where partial property rights were considered in a renewable resource economy, we 
find again that partial property rights can be optimal in a perfectly competitive 
economy where agents live finite lives and where physical capital and labor are 
used as production inputs. Complete property rights are then inefficient. Partial 
property rights are inefficient when the economy is dynamically efficient. Therefore, 
one may wonder how likely it is for an economy to be dynamically inefficient with 
complete property rights. Abel et al. (1989) develops a criterion for determining 
whether an economy is dynamically efficient. In application to the United States 
economy and the economies of other major OECD nations, their results suggest that 
those economies are dynamically efficient. However, the effective quality of property 
rights in those countries is not explicitly considered in that study. Moreover, the 
main message of this paper is that, even in a perfectly competitive economy with 
overlapping generations, partial property rights can be optimal. 
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Chapitre 5 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that partial property rights are efficient under different circum-
stances that we formally specified. Complete property rights are then inefficient 
under these circumstances. In other words, the paradigm, according to which ineffi-
ciencies are a consequence of weak institutions that allow such ill behavior as theft, 
is partly reversed . Inefficiencies can also be a consequence of too strong property 
rights. In chapter 2, we considered a renewable resource economy where a limited 
number of firms exercised market power. Under standard assumptions, we showed 
that , even in the absence of completion and enforcement costs for the government, 
partial property rights could be efficient. Our results could provide an explanation 
for the existence of mixed regulatory /property rights regimes such as in sorne ova 
Scotia fisheries, in sorne New Zealand ITQ regimes or in the South Pars/North Dame 
gas field. The determination of an analytic expression of that optimal quality of pro-
perty rights has highlighted its main determinants. Greater buyer 's responsiveness 
to priee is consistent with more complete optimal property rights. Technology is an 
important determinant of the optimal quality of property rights. The dependence 
86 
of the optimal quality of proper ty rights to technology can also be regarded as a 
dependence to the relative priee of output and input. The more valuable is out-
put compared to input , the more complete property rights must be. Our results 
are consistent with Demsetz (1967)'s findings on the emergence of property rights : 
property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization 
become larger than the cost of internalization. In fact , we build on Demsetz (1967) 's 
findings and explain how the outcome of the development of property rights, as a 
consequence of changes in economie values, is affected by the presence of market 
power : the more valuable is the output compared to the input, the greater the pro-
fits, the more intense is the commons problem and stronger part ial property rights 
should be to offset market power. Biology impacts t he optimal quality of property 
rights : when the stock of resource is more sensitive to harvesting efforts, optimal 
property rights can be more complete. Our results also confirmed Hotelling (193l)'s 
intuition of the existence of a tension between the number of firms and the optimal 
quality of property rights. 
In chapter 3, we relaxed the assumption of the existence of market imperfections 
in the form of market power and considered a perfectly competitive renewable re-
source economy with overlapping generat ions. We have seen that complete property 
rights can lead to resource overaccumulation at the steady-state. When property 
rights are complete, households appropriate themselves a share of the resource stock 
that should opt imally be used in production. We have shawn that there always 
exists a quality of property rights on the resource stock, though not necessarily 
complete, leading to steady-state optimal resource extraction and resource stock. 
Optimal partial property rights increase the lifetime welfare of all individuals. 
In chapter 4, we continued to investigate the optimal quality of property rights 
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in a perfectly competitive economy. In an OLG economy where conventional capital 
rather than a renewable resource was used as the savings vehicle and input in pro-
duction, we have shown that efficient capital accumulation could be reached when 
young agents cannot fully appropriate their income. We explained how conventional 
capital differs from a renewable resource and we have shown that partial property 
rights are efficient when the economy is dynamically inefficient. 
Overfishing, deforestation, endangered species often result from institutions that 
are too weak. Although property rights may need to be strengthened in those si-
tuations, we show in this thesis that they do not need to be complete to achieve 
efficiency. Strong, efficient institutions often need to fall short of imposing complete 
property rights. Beyond a certain quality of property rights, strengthening them 
further is inefficient. 
Several additional extensions remain. In our current research, the quality of pro-
perty rights is essentially an exogenous parameter. There is a strand of the economie 
literature that considers endogenous property rights including Hotte (2005) and Co-
peland and Taylor (2009). A question remains asto whether a perfectly competitive 
economy, where agents have finite life, would endogenously acquire efficient property 
rights. Another extension could build on the findings : first, that weak property rights 
on production output generally reduce harvesting whereas weak property rights on 
production input increase harvesting (Hotte et al., 2013); second, that market im-
perfections lead to either under harvesting such as incomplete information on the 
re~ource stock (Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz Garcia, 2011), etc. or over harvesting 
(risk, existence of a backstop resource, etc ... ) in order to investigate whether there 
exists partial property rights, on either production input, or output, that always 
optimally counterbalance those market imperfections. The second-best optimality 
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of partial property rights in presence of multiple market imperfections would also 
be worth studying. Finally, a formal study of the dynamic traj ectory of the quality 
of property rights leading to its optimal steady-state may be of interest. 
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Nous avons vu dans différentes circonstances que des droits de propriété partiels 
sont optimaux. Des droits de propriétés complets sont alors inefficaces. En d'autres 
termes, le paradigme selon lequel l'inefficacité est une conséquence de droits de 
propriété trop faibles est en partie contredite. Des inefficacités peuvent découler 
de droits de propriété trop complets. Dans le chapitre 2, nous avons considéré une 
économie avec une ressource naturelle renouvelable dans laquelle un nombre limité 
de firmes exerçaient leur pouvoir de marché. Sous des hypothèses standards, nous 
avons montré que même en l'absence de coût de définition et de protection des droits 
de propriété pour un gouvernement, des droits de propriété partiels peuvent être 
optimaux. Nos résultats peuvent fournir une explication à l'existence de régimes 
de droits de propriété mixtes tels que les régimes de quotas en Nouvelle-Ecosse 
ou en Nouvelle-Zélande ou tel que celui qui prévaut au gisement de gaz de South 
Pars/North Dome. Nous avons determiné une expression analytique de cette qualité 
optimale des droits de propriété afin de mettre en évidence les différents paramètres 
qui la determine. Une plus forte réponse des consommateurs à des variations de prix 
est ainsi cohérente avec des droits de propriété plus complets. La technologie est 
aussi un déterminant important de la qualité optimale des droits de propriété. La 
dépendance à la technologie peut aussi être comprise comme une dépendance de 
la qualité optimale des droits de propriété au prix relatif de la production et des 
intrants. Plus la production est précieuse par rapport aux intrants, plus les droits de 
propriété doivent être complets. Nos résultats sont cohérents avec ceux de Demsetz 
(1967) sur l'émergence de droits de propriété : les droits de popriété se développent 
pour internaliser les externalités quand les gains de l'internalisation excedent leurs 
couts. En fait, nous batissons sur les résultats de Demsetz et expliquons comment 
les effets de la mise en place de droits de propriété, en réponse à des changements 
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dans les valeurs économiques, sont affectés par la présence de pouvoir de marché : 
plus la production a de la valeur par rappor t aux intrants plus les profi ts sont 
importants, plus le problème des ressources communes est important et moins il est 
nécessaire que les droits de propriété soient partiels pour compenser l'exercice du 
pouvoir de marché par les firmes. La biologie a aussi des conséquence sur la qualité 
optimale des droits de propriété : quand un stock est plus sensibl aux variations 
d 'efforts, les droits de propriété optimaux peuvent être plu · complets. Enfin, nos 
résultats confirment l'int uition d 'Hotelling (1931) sur l'existence d 'une tension entre 
le nombre de firmes et la qualité optimale des droits de propriété. 
Dans le chapit re 3, nous relâchons l'hypothèse de l'existence d'une imperfection 
de marché sous la forme de pouvoir de marché et considérons une économie parfaite-
ment compétitive avec générations imbriquées qui exploite une ressource naturelle. 
Nous avons vu que des droits de propriété complets peuvent conduire à une sur-
accumulation de la ressource à l'état stationnaire. Quand les droits de propriété 
sont complets, les ménages s'approprient sous forme d'épargne une proportion de 
la ressource qui devrait optimalement être utilisée dans la production. ous mon-
trons qu 'il existe touj ours une qualité des droits de propriété (les droits optimaux 
sont parfois partiels) qui permettent d 'atteindre les niveaux de stock de ressource et 
d 'extraction optimaux de premier rang à l'état stationnaire. Les droits de propriété 
partiels optimaux accroissent l'utilité de tous les agents sur l'ensemble de leur vie. 
Dans le chapitre 4, nous continuons l'étude de la qualité optimale des droits 
de propriété dans une économie parfaitement compétitive. Dans un modèle à gé-
nérations imbriquées où le capital plutôt qu'une ressource naturelle renouvelable 
est utilisé comme véhicule d'épargne et facteur de production, nous montrons que 
l'accumulation de capital optimale peut être atteinte quand les jeunes agents ne 
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s'approprient pas la totalité de leurs revenus issus du travail. Nous expliquons com-
ment le capital diffère d'une ressource naturelle renouvelable et nous montrons que 
des droits de propriété partiels sont optimaux en présence d 'inefficacité dynamique. 
La surpêche, la déforestation, la mise en danger d 'espèces animales peuvent être 
la conséquence d'institutions trop faibles. Bien que les droits de propriété doivent 
certainement être renforcés dans ces situations, cette thèse montre formellement 
qu'ils n 'ont souvent pas besoin d'être complets pour être optimaux. Des institutions 
fortes, optimales ne sont pas toujours celles qui imposent des droits complets. Au delà 
d 'une certaine qualité des droits de propriété, les renforcer davantage est inefficace. 
Plusieurs extensions à ce travail de recherche peuvent être considérées. Dans 
cette thèse, la qualité des droits de propriété est essentiellement une variable exo-
gène. Il existe une litterature qui endogénéise la qualité des droits de propriété (par 
exemple Hotte (2005) ou Copeland and Taylor (2009)). Il serait intéressant d 'étudier 
si une économie parfaitement compétitive où les agents ont une durée de vie finie 
se doterait de manière endogène d 'une qualité des droits de propriété optimale. Un 
autre développement pourrait se baser d'une part sur le fait qu 'il a été montré par 
Hotte et al. (2013) que des droits de propriété partiels sur la production réduisent 
en général l'exploitation tandis que des droits partiels sur les intrants accroissent 
l'exploitation et , d 'autre part sur le fait que des imperfections de marchés peuvent 
conduire soit à une sous-exploitation de la ressource telle que de l'information in-
complète sur le stock de ressource (Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz Garcia, 2011), 
soit au contraire à une surexploitation de la ressource (présence de risque, d 'une 
ressource de substitution, etc .. ) afin d'étudier s'il existe toujours des droits de pro-
priété partiels qui peuvent compenser optimalement les effets de ces imperfections 
de marché. L'optimalité de second-rang des droits de propriété partiels quand plu-
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sieures imperfections de marché existent simultanément constituerait également un 
sujet d'étude intéressant. Enfin, l'étude de la trajectoire dynamiquement optimale 
d 'une qualité des droits de propriété peut aussi avoir un intérêt. 
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Annexe A Analytic expression of the optimal qua-
lity 
We adopt the standard functional form : 
n 
~ ei 
IJ!(ei , 0 ej) = I:n e 
#i i=1 ' 
Since f3 = 1 ~8 , equation (2.3) can be rewritten as : 
1- g Ci 
h(ei, S(E)) = - n-H + 2::::~= 1 ei BH 
(A.1) 
We can use (A.1) to rewrite (2.6) as : 
aH P' (H)h(ei, S(E)) + P(H ) [1-g aH + 2::::~=~ ei - :i BH + :i BaH] = w 
aei n aei (2:::i=1 ei ) I:i=1 ei aei 
At the symmetric Nash equilibrium, ci= ê Vi , then Ê = nê and S = S(Ê) , we 
have: 
r(ê; e, n) 8HI , aci ê,s P' (H )h(ê, S) 
+P(ÎI) [1-e aHI + (n - l) e~ + ~e aHI ] 
n ae. . . n ne n ae. . . 
t E, S 2 E ,S 
We want ê( B*) = e*, so if B* exists, it must be solution of : 
aH 1 P'(H*) h(e* (n) , S*) 
Oei E•,s• 
+P(H*) [1 - B aHI + (n- 1 ) 11 H: +~0 aHI l 
n aei E* s• n E n aei E· s• , , 
= P(H*) 8HI 
Oei E•,S• 
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Rearranging we have : 
~H 1 P'(H*) h(e*(n), S*) 
ue, E* ,s• 
+ (1 _ B)(P(H*) fJH 1 ) + B(P(H*}H* + !:_(P(H*) fJH 1 _ P(H*}H*) 
n fJei E* ,s• E n fJei E* ,s• E 
= P(H*) fJH 1 (A.3) 
8ei E* ,s• 
If we divide both sides of (A.3) by ~H 1 P(H*), we obtain: 
el E* ,S* 
P'(H*)h(e* (n) , S(E*)) 1 - () B(H* 1 1 ( H * 1 ) _ (A ) 
_:..___...:....._.:__:...._:___;_:....:... + -- + - + - 1 - - - 1 .4 
P(H*) n E* &Hl n E* &H l 
âe;. E* ,s• âe; E* ,s• 
P'(H *)h(e*(n) S*) The tcrm P(H*) ' can be rewritten as : 
P'(H*) h(e*(n), S(E*)) 
P (H *) 
P'(H*)H * 1 
nP(H*) ntn 
with En the market elasticity of demand at point (E* , H*). 
We call f.c the effort elasticity of harvest at (E*, H *) : 
f.c = ;: ~~ IE*,S* 
We can rewrite (A.4) as : 
and finally : 
1 1 -B 1 1 
-+ - +B[---]= 1 
nf.D n f.c nf.c 
()* 1 f.c = Ec+ ---
1 - nf.n (A.5) 
Equation (A.5) is an analytic expression of the optimal quality of property rights. 
Before discussing the conditions of existence of ()*, it can be verified that when the 
number of firms is infinite (i.e., n ----t oo) then ()* ----t 0 as f.c ----t 0 when n ----t oo ; the 
well-known result according to which property rights must be complete to reach the 
first-best optimum is verified. 
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Annexe B Derivation of the condition of existence 
In orcier for 8* to exist, it must verify 8* E [0, 1]. 
For given technologies and market demand, the conditions of existence of 8* are 
conditions on the number of firms n. 
For 8* :::; 1, we must have : 
1 Ec 
E + --- < 1 
c 1 -nEo-
which, remembering that as n > 1 and Eo < 0, (1 - n)Eo is positive, leads to : 
1 Ec 
--- - 1 < -n 
1 - Ec Eo -
and 
_ 1 Ec 
n >n= 1 + - - -
- Ec - 1 Eo 
n is the Pareto optimal number of firms in pure common-access as defined in 
equation ( 4) of Cornes et al. (1986) 's article. 
Annexe C Proof of proposition 3.1 
We rewrite (3 .14) and (3. 15) as: 
j"' (h ) = [u' [f(ht)- f'(ht)ht- ~f'(ht) Xt+l]] f'(h) (C.2) 
t+l ,68[1 + g'(Xt+l)] t 
Substituting (C.1) into (C.2) leads to : 
';::;' ( h) = f'(h ) _ [u'[f(ht)- f'(ht)ht- ~f'(ht)[xt- ht + g (xt)ll]f'(h) = 0 ~ Xt, t t+l ,68[1 + g'(Xt- ht + g (xt))] t 
(C.3) 
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which defines a two arguments implicit function for ht+l : 
(C.4) 
The planar system describing the dynamics of the resource stock and harvesting 
now consists of (C.1) and (C.4) and the stability of the steady-states depends on 
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the partial derivatives of the system : 
J = [ Gx Gv l 
F.-r F.v 
The determinant of the Jaco bian is D = GxFh- GhFx and the trace is T = Gx + Fh· 
The characteristics polynomial is : 
p(() = ( 2 - T( + D = 0 
From the stability theory of difference equations (Azariadis, 1993), we know that, 
for a saddle point, the roots of p(À) need to be on both sides of unity. Thus, we need 
that D - T + 1 < 0 and D + T + 1 > 0 or D - T + 1 > 0 and D + T + 1 < O. We 
find: 
1 + g' (xt) 
-1 
and the implicit function theorem gives : 
F __ ~x , (xt, ht) d F _ _ ~h.(xt , ht) 
xt - ~ ( h ) an h t - ~ ( 1 ) 
.::.ht.+l Xt, t .::.ht+l Xt, 1t 
That is, 
1 [- i(f'(ht)) 2u"(ct) [1 + g'(xt)] ] 
{3Bf"(ht+l) (1 + g'(xt+I)) 
_ 1 [J' (ht)u' ( Ct)g" (xt+I) ( 1 + g' (xt))] 
{3Bf"(ht+I) [(1 + g'(xt+I))F 
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1 [ f"(ht)u'(ct) ] 
/3& f"(ht+l) (1 + g'(xt+l)) 
1 [ f'(ht)u"(ct) [~ - f"(ht)( x ,. +g(~t) - ht. + ht)] l 
+ {3 Bf"(ht+l) (1 + g'(xt+l)) 
1 [J' ( ht)u' ( Ct)g" ( xt+d ] 
+ f3 Bf"(ht+l) (1 + g'(xt+l))2 
Evaluating the elements of the J acobian at the steady state and utilizing the facts 
that u' = /3&(1 + g') and h = g : 
Gx(xt, ht) 1 + g' 
Gh(Xt, ht) - 1 
(!' )
2 
u" f'u" [E. + h] f'g" 
F (x h ) - 1 + 0 - · e + > 0 h t , t - /3& !" (1 + g') /3&(1 + g') (1 + g')f" 
Based on these partial derivatives, the t race T and the determinant D of the cha-
racteristic polynomial can be calculated to be : 
D GxFh- GhFx 
1 
, U/u" f'u" [~+h] f'g'' - ~(f') 2u"-f'f3Bg" 
( + g ) + {3& f" - {3& + y + {3& f" 
which simplifies to : 
f'u" [x + h] 
D = (1 + g')- 0 > 0 {3& 
and 
(! ' )
2 
u" f'u" [2'. + h] f'g" 
2+ '+ 0 B + > 1 g {3 Bj"(1 + g') - {3B(1 + g') (1 + g')f" 
98 
It is easy to see that D + T + 1 > 0 holds. The nature of the stability of the steady-
states then depends crucially on the sign of D - T + 1. Calculating D - T + 1 
g1ves : 
1 [ J' "[x h] [ g' ] J' (J' " (3 () ")] (3 () - u e + 1 + g' - J"(1 + g') eu + g (C.5) 
To determine the sign of D -T+ 1, we compare the slopes of the growth curve and 
the consumer optimization condition at the steady state. At the steady-state, the 
slope of the Euler equation is : 
( u" f_ + (3()g") () > 0 
- J"u"(~ + h) 
At the larger steady-state, the consumer first-order condition cuts the growth curve 
from below and we have : 
( u" f_ + (3Bg") 
e > g' 
- J"u"( ~ + h) 
which can be rewritten as, keeping in mind that - f"u" [~ + h] < 0, 
0 < g'(- J"u"(!:_ + h)) - (J' u" + (38g") () () 
Finally, multiplying both sides by J' and dividing both sides by J" < 0 and 1 + g', 
we obtain: 
0 >-J'u"(!:_ + h) ][ - 91-]- J' (J' u" + (3Bg") (C.6) () 1 + g' J" ( 1 + g') () 
Multiplying both sides of equation (C.6) by Je implies : 
1 [ J' "[x h][ g' ] J' (J' " (3() ")] (3() - u e + 1 + g' - J"(1 + g') eu + g < 0 (C.7) 
The left hand-side of equation (C.7) is D-T+ 1 (equation (C.5)) which proves that 
D - T + 1 < 0 W E [ë, 1]. 
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Annexe D Illustration using a logarithmic period 
utility and a Cobb-Douglas technology 
With logarithmic preferences and a Cobb-Douglas technology, equation (4.19) 
can be rcwritten as : 
(1 +n)kt+l = _p_f3 (1- 'P)(1- a)kf- ___!_f3'P (1 - a)(1 + n) kt+l (D.1) 
1+ · 1+ a 
which implies : 
k _ [ af3(1 - 'P)(1- a) ] k01 
t+l - (1 + n) [(1 + f3 )a + tp(1- a)] t (D.2) 
At the steady-state, equation (D .1 ) becomes : 
(1 + n)k* = f3 (1- 'P)(1- a)k*OI- 1 'P(1- a)( 1 + n) k*) 
(1 + (3 ) 1 + f3 a 
which can be rewritten as : 
k* [ (1 + n) [(1 + f3)a + tp(1- a)] _ (3(1- 'P)(1 - a) k*a-l] = 0 (D.3) (1 + f3)a (1 + (3 ) 
We find two steady-states : a trivial one ky = 0 which is not a viable economie 
equilibrium and 
1 
* [ af3( 1 - tp)(1- a) ] 1-o 
k = (1 + n) [( 1 + f3 )a + tp(1- a)] (D.4) 
For a E (0, 1), f3 E (0, 1) and 'P E (0, 1), we have k* > O. We focus on the stability 
properties of k*. In order to determine, the local stability property of k*, we must 
study the value of d~~: 1 at k*. First , if property rights are complete 'P = 0, it is 
well-known (De la Croix and Michel, 2002) that with logarithmic preferences and 
a Cobb-Douglas production function, the strictly positive steady-state is globally 
stable: for all k0 > 0 the trajectory converges to k*. When 'P E (0 , 1) , using equation 
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(D.2), we find : 
dkt+11 
dkt k* [ 
a,6(1- cp)(1- a) ] k* 01 _ 1 
a (1 + n) [(1 + ,6)a + cp(1- a)] • 
dkt+ll 
dkt k* [ 
a,6(1 - cp)(1- a) ] [ a,6(1- cp)(1- a) ] - 1 
a (1 + n) [(1 + ,6)a + cp(1 -a)] (1 + n) [(1 + ,6 )a + cp(1 -a)] 
dkt+11 
dkt k* 
(D.5) 
For a E (0, 1) and cp E (0 , 1), equation (D.5) implies: 
dkt+l 1 0 < dk; k* = a < 1 
Therefore, t he steady-state defined by equation (D.4) with cp E (0, 1) is locally stable 
and the convergence is monotonous. 
Using equation (D.4), we find: 
~~ = [ a,6(1 - cp)( 1 + n) [( 1 + ,6)a + cp(1- a)] [(1 + n) [( 1 + ,6)a + cp(1 - a)]J 2 
_ [(1 + n)(1- a)a,6(1- cp)(1 - a)] ] 
[(1 + n) [(1 + ,6)a + cp(1- a)]] 2 
[ 
a ,6 (1 - cp)(1- a) ] 1~" 
(1 + n) [( 1 + ,6)a + cp(1- a)] < 0 
The weaker the property rights (i .e., the higher cp), the lower the capital-labor 
ratio at the decentralized steady-state. 
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Annexe E Analytic expression of the optimal qua-
lity of property rights when the tech-
nology is Cobb-Douglas and preferences 
are logarithmic 
Using equations (4.24) and (D.4), equation (4.25) implies : 
1 1 
[ 
a,B(1 - <p*)(1- a) ] ï=-;; [ a ] -r=-;; 
(1 + n) [(1 + ,B )a + <p* (1 - a)] - (1 + n) 
which leads to : 
-:--,8 ..:...._( 1::-:----'-<p--'* )....:....( 1--,---a--'-)--.,.. = 1 (1 + ,B)a + <p*( 1 -a) (E.7) 
It can be verified that when property rights are complete, <p = 0, the competitive 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal when : 
(1 -a) (1+,8) 
a ,B 
which is a well-known result . Here we consider situations where (l :o) > (1; {3 ). We 
can rewrite (E. 7) as : 
1- o 1+ {3 
* c;-----r;-
<p = (1 + ,8) (1- a) f3~ (E.8) 
The optimal quality of property rights depends on the utility discount factor ,B and 
the elasticity of capital input productivity a. 
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